NEW TIMES

September 17–23, 1991

Vojciech Jaruzelski – experience with military coups

37

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

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

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A SOVIET WEEKLY

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

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From our mailbag

■ For many years I've been a subscriber, but I'm writing to you for the first time to congratulate the *NT* magazine on the victory of democracy.

The entire 93-year-long activity of this country's Communist Party has been a chain of violations of the law. This Party believes in and advertises forcible methods of solving problems which have led to innumeralable victims, both human lives and morals, among the nations oppressed by the CPSU. This party does not take responsibility for the crimes committed by its orders and under its guidance and sticks to its old position. Therefore, I suggest:

proclaming the activity of the CPSU on the territory of Russia criminal and illegal; disbanding the Party and nationalizing its property;

registering a new Communist Party, if such emerges, only if its Rules and programme correspond to the Constitution and the laws of the Russian Federation;

checking of the Rules and programmes of other parties registered on the territory of the Russian Federation against Russia's Constitution and laws;

considering criminal any party which proclaims itself a successor of the CPSU;

holding early elections to the Soviets at all levels.

Alexander Vasilyev,
Moscow, USSR

■ Until recently an overwhelming majority of us wouldn't have thought even in the wildest dreams that the slogans "The people and the party are one" and "The Army is for the people" are monstrous lies. The military coup and the previous events in Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Riga demonstrated the danger of the army. The people and society shuddered seeing their complete vulnerability.

What's the reason for the army leaders' readiness to give any kind of order? Any order, including the fatal one to shoot at their own people, to whom they swore allegiance. The people who stood in power were guided by elementary **fear**. In our system power is a way to great privileges. And to lose privileges is to lose everything. It means the one has wasted his life. The political leaders from the CPSU ranks and the army leaders were faightened by the prospect of losing power, government-provided country houses and cars, and of being left with a modest

A lesson in History for a 13-year-old girl

■ If Livia Yermakova had not mentioned in her letter published in the magazine's No. 31 issue (Russian edition) that she was 13 years old I would hardly have responded to it. I dont't want to think that it was the girl's father who used his daughter's name. With the present level of education a 13-year-old may not know elementary things and she can easily believe that history is made not by people but only by circumstances and think that the freedom and independence necessary for her people are not so necessary for others. This is what the girl says about our country: "True, part of our land was conquered, but that's history". Of course, it's history: Georgia joined our country 190 years ago, Armenia – some 160 years ago, Kyrgyzstan - around 130, Lithuania – 50. But though 150 years had passed since the Tartars occupied Russia, Dmitri Donskoi did not care much for "history" and fought the Tartars at the Kulikovo field. Of course, one can say that he lacked the political wisdom of Alexander Nevsky, who realized that it was better to submit to Asian infidels than to European Christians, a mere two years' after the Kulikovo battle Toktamish invaded Moscow again and devastated it with hellish brutality. Another hundred years was to pass before the confrontation on the Ugra River, when Russia was strong enough to become independent. And nevertheless, Russia's sovereignty was predetermined by Dmitri Donskoi. Glory to him!

But shortly after the Ugra events Russia completed its unification and started slowly turning into an **empire** at the expense of the foreign lands it occupied. It was not the enemies of Russia who labelled it Empire, it was the country's official name. And just like Dmitri Donskoi before them Salavat Yulayev, Tadeusz Kosciusko, Shamil, Taras Shevchenko and many others struggled for their nations' independence.

Bolsheviks couldn't think of anything better than to convince the girl that having cut the allegedly single country into republics and autonomous regions, they had met the demands of the existing national-liberation movements in order to appease them. But they met these demands only partially and rather in words than in deeds, having preserved the extreme power of the centre, which is the cause of the present bloodshed. At present we see people in the political arena who do not care for this bloodshed and who are eager to abolish even the present national republics and establish provinces. But the 13-year-old girl should know that in order to achieve this the boys in her class will have either to be killed or to kill people in Georgia, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, and God khows where else. Isn't the girl sorry for them?

Her teachers and parents concealed from her that Britain withdrew from India and France – from Algeria because they had to pay with the blood of their soldiers for the ability to decide these countries' destinies. Despite our *glasnost* the girl has never heard or read that those who tried to decide for other nations – Hungary, Czechoslavakia and Afghanistan – caused irreparable damage to their own people. And the only hope that our country has to avoid this fate is that at least our children will be able to realize its sad experience.

Poel Karp
Leningrad, USSR

How did Moscow use Latvia's money?

When people lose the last hope they reach for the gun

Until recently Yasov's picture could be bought for 12 rubles 3 kopeks

pension. Doesn't that explain why a five-star general in the US receives a higher pension than the president? We can hardly understand this. When the press raised the question of government-provided dachas for the generals, it made me shiver. The generals are losing their last hope – they can automatically reach for the gun.

O. Khodjaev, journalist
Turkmenia, USSR

■ A few days ago Yazov's portrait in black and white could be purchased in a store for 12 rubles 3 kopeks. A reasonable price, but who needs a minister on the wall? Or a portrait of Gorbachev? As if we have to cover the spots left on the walls of offices and halls from the portraits of Stalin and his "team" with a new king for a day. Of course, the progress is obvious: in the six years of *perestroika* we've managed to liquidate the picturesque alleys of portraits of the Politburo members which existed in every city. The money spent for these portraits could have been used to built a small town or a new aircraft carrier – the dream of Viktors Alksnis.

When shall we get rid of idolatry? And in what other country do they hang portraits of political leaders on the walls while they are still alive? Perhaps in the Central African Republic, where Emperor Bokassa not so long ago engaged in cannibalism?

Oleg Ponomarev
Leningrad, USSR

■ I've read the letter from Y. Sakhovskaya (N 22/91), who is looking for her German friend, arrested in 1983 for anti-socialist propaganda and later deported to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Since 1989 I've been trying (so far in vain) through my German friends to find out something about the fate of professor Georg Jacoby. In 1945-49 he headed the university clinic of skin diseases in Halle. At that time I worked as a military interpreter for the health care sector of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (Saxony-Anhalt). I often met with that anti-fascist, a former inmate of a nazi death camp. Professor Jacoby was a fearless person who had his own understanding of many things around him and whose views often differed from the official ones. Jacoby's contribution to science was mentioned in a report of our health care sector.

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

But then (I saw a copy of this document) his name was deleted from the report with a bright blue crayon. Much later it came to my attention that Jacoby had moved to the West. I haven't heard of him since, although I would like to...

S. Vernikov, former medical attendant, military interpreter and journalist
Sverdlovsk Region, USSR

■ A Message to the Citizens of the Soviet Union.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my greatest feelings of respect and gratitude toward your actions of courage and justice in the coup d'etat which took place just a few days ago. You have risked your lives to protect not only the peace in your country, but world peace itself.

I hope that you will never ever forget your courageous feelings and efforts.

I understand that there are many, many difficult problems in your country, and I believe that the countries around the world will increase their support as a result of these past incidents. However, you must make a democratic movement yourselves, because your democratic movements have to meet the requests of the democratic movement lead by the country. I hope that you will continue to confront all of the difficult problems in your country. I, myself, and perhaps everyone around the world, support your brave efforts. I believe that we will be able to cooperate with each other by forming everlasting friedship.

Last but not least, I pray that the courageous victims who lost their lives in this incident will rest in peace.

Dr. Toshi Hattori
Tokio, Japan

Compiled by T. Chernova

The theft

■ Our magazine *Liesma* has carried another proof that the big and generous Soviet Union which arrived in Latvia in tanks in 1940 engaged not only in murder, plundering, and mass deportations, but also in common theft.

The invaders stole three photographs and a golden wedding ring from Irene Aline, a silver teaspoon from Revekka Kann, gold and silver crosses and a comb from Eduardas Vilde, etc. These cases are listed in a document which for 50 years was kept (or rather was hidden) in the archives of the Latvian republican office of the USSR State Bank.

It is a list of valuables expropriated from Latvia's private banks and moved to the USSR. Of four signatures on the document only one legible – K. Bubeics, the authorized agent of the Central Bank of Latvia.

The fate of the stolen things is obvious – most likely they got into the Soviet financial system. And a considerable part must have found their way into the pockets of the thieves. One thing remains unclear – when did it all take place? According to the most popular version, the valuables were confiscated from the Latvian bank on July 12-13 1940, after the arrival of the Soviet troops but before Latvia was officially annexed to the USSR. Vyshinski and his band now had a formal cause to say: you see how Ulmanis decieved you, you are poor, you have nothing left in your bank!

It is not clear so far when Mrs. Aline and her heirs will get back their photographs and the ring. So far the central government has been blackmailing Latvia, demanding billions from it for the hopeless treatment of its economic impotence.

And what if the Soviet Union collapses? Who will pay then?

Ivars Rozenbergs
Yelgava, Latvia

FORECAST

No fourth Rome

Though a new commonwealth should emerge from the ruins of this erstwhile empire, the political regimes in some republics may stand in their way to it

Galina Starovoitova,
People's Deputy of the USSR
and the Russian Federation

The epoch of the world's last empire is over. Now we are to build a new confederation on its ruins. Will it have nine or ten members? That is not yet clear. Much will depend on the draft of the new Union Treaty. The old one needs to be revised to more dependably protect republican sovereignty. Thus, the centre must no longer supervise hard currency traffic, the gold reserve, or fiscal emission. These matters must be under the republics' authority and be supervised by a control chamber in place of the USSR Finance Ministry. It is also necessary to coordinate the work of the republican KGBs inclusive of intelligence and counterintelligence, not just subordinate them to the central apparatus as Kryuchkov had wanted.

Power structures during the transition period

Before the new Union Treaty is signed, the supreme bodies of power will undergo essential changes. The present State Council, which has taken over from the old Federation Council and which is composed of the USSR President and heads of the ten – or perhaps nine – republics, will now play a more significant role. The new Supreme Soviet is to be based on the Novo-Ogaryovo model, while an interrepublican economic committee, structured on the basis of parity, will replace the Cabinet of Ministers.

In all likelihood it would have been hard to conjure up better bodies for the transition period. The paramount task now is to create the rules for their operation. Thus we still do not know whether the State Council, the former Federation Council, will put matters to a vote, or will have all matters decided by a so-called consensus as was the case in the old Politbureau, when the chair sought unanimity from all involved.

The Supreme Soviet must be formed before the end of this month. Its upper chamber, the Council of the Republics, will consist of 232 deputies, including 20 each from nine of the republics, plus 52 from the Russian Federation. However, each republic will have only one vote. This in effect recognizes the equality of peoples and nations, the equality of national cultures regardless of territorial size, population, or the inner administration inclusive of autonomies. It stands to reason that as regards republics with complex inner structures, this one vote will need to be agreed upon.

The upper chamber will be formed by the parliaments of the republics themselves from among USSR and republican People's Deputies. Though we do not know how many deputies of the 1989 convocation will be entrusted with the interests of their republics, logic tells us that greater confidence will be placed in the deputies elected two years later, when there were none of the restrictions that affected the 1989 electoral law.

The lower chamber, the Council of the Union, will still consist of 272 deputies, according to a proportional quota, from among the USSR People's Deputies, and thus will reflect the varied numerical strength of the populations of the different territories.

The main problem now is to find real professionals to work at all levels as administrators. I think this is our main stumbling block. Even in the Russian Federation, after the emergence of an executive presidency, many ministerial posts remain vacant. Now, after the vote of no-confidence in the entire USSR Cabinet of Ministers, we shall need many ministers for both Union and Russian Federation structures.

Are a Constitution and presidential elections necessary?

The new Union Treaty could stand forth as the fundamental document for regulating relationships bet-

ween the members of the new community. I personally think this document should have no mention of a USSR Constitution.

In the first place, this state no longer exists, while in the second place, each republic, in line with the desires of its people and the level of its socio-economic and political development, may choose its own political and economic system. This implies that republican constitutions will vary and that a Union Constitution should not be thrust upon them. In one and the same territory, we may have operating only one constitution, that of the sovereign state in question, not of the entire commonwealth.

Eighteen months ago, in March 1990, when the first, and I think last, USSR presidential elections were held, the parliamentary opposition in the form of the Interregional Group of Deputies (IGD) pressed for popular elections. In this manner, though unaware of it, we offered the President his last chance to be popularly elected – though, true, we did not know who actually would have been the president then. However, because of the election procedure the entire multifaceted federation felt itself, perhaps for the last time, to be one entity with a united electorate having common bodies of power that voiced the interests of everyone in one way or another. That implied not only united USSR presidential elections, but also the entire Union's continued existence. The voice of the opposition was discounted, and this historic option was lost once and for all.

While paying tribute to President Gorbachev for what he has done for the country, one nevertheless feels obliged to note that he is a tragic figure in our history and that in future textbooks for schoolchildren he will go down as the USSR's first and last president. The peoples who already have popularly elected presidents in some republics, or who elsewhere are planning to have their own presidents, will simply not vote for an upper-level president. Today it would be more realistic to speak of the choice of a president from among the members of the State Council as an agency of representative democracy inasmuch as its functions, its powers, and its legitimate authority will be different, playing as it does only the role of coordination.

Dictatorships and the new comity

Now, particularly after the recent developments, we must impose rigid restrictions as regards entry into the new commonwealth. What I have in mind is the political regime existing in some of the republics.

How can Russia, the Ukraine, or Armenia sign a Union Treaty with a state that rides roughshod over human rights and violates basic fundamental freedoms? Or with republics that still have no *glasnost*, let alone freedom of speech, where there still exist political prisoners whose number is growing, where the rights of national minorities are infringed upon?

What I have in mind here is not the social and economic system which each new state chooses – it is their internal affair, but political regime, civic rights and freedoms which should conform to international legal norms. What I have in mind is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international covenants which the Soviet Union has ratified.

Ratification of these documents will not be enough. It will also be necessary to set up a "blue helmeted fire brigade," implying a group of experts from different republics that will watch over the observance of these documents. Apparently the creation of such a body must be recognized even within the framework of the previous Union, as one that would exercise priority at least as regards an opinion as to how well the political regime in one or another republic meets international norms. This body's appraisal may provide grounds for expelling a republic from the commonwealth.

The lot of the unwanted

The last Congress of USSR People's Deputies abided by the IDG call in effect to bow out decently and in this difficult moment of choice sacrifice their personal interests and status for the sake of the interests of the sovereign republics. However, several unexpected consequences ensue from this.

A considerable portion of the deputies who have already quitted their old jobs and perhaps even their constituencies will have nothing to do. As, for instance, the generals or colonels who are currently being energetically retired on service pensions, though many of them have yet to turn fifty.

Then there are other deputies who did not make much of a mark when serving the people, as they preferred to win the patronage of the CPSU Central Committee or local regional and district Party committees. True, now they seek the support of their own republican parliaments, which,

unfortunately, is belated. It is quite possible that such deputies who have been allowed to retain status, immunity, etc., till 1994 and still wear their badges but no longer exercise power, will begin to form political or social groups and, God forbid, go underground.

Motley mosaic

Now that the sham unity of the republics has collapsed, ethnocultural stratification will rapidly proceed, with the various faiths and religious entities playing a much greater consolidating role. Hence in some five to six years we will have in place of the erstwhile Soviet Union a far more motley social and political mosaic.

Though, of course, it would not be entirely uninteresting to foresee how each republic will develop, I think that many of the tendencies mentioned will be typical of all peoples. However, let me note a republic whose entry into the Union may well be decisive for retaining not only Slavonic unity, but generally the unity of the entire Union, as well as the European orientation of Russia herself. The republic I have in mind is the Ukraine.

About half a year ago I predicted that this republic would become a federation. After all, it is a huge country, bigger than the UK and many European countries, with a population of 50 million, considerable natural and cultural potentials, and deep-seated internal ethnoregional differences. As I see it, there are at least five different regions here.

The specific character of the Crimean problem is common knowledge with an autonomous Crimean republic having already emerged. Further we have the Russian-speaking industrialized western regions of the Donbas and Zaporozhie that gravitate towards definite models of cultural and possibly political structures. Then there is the central zone, the Ukraine proper, which upon closer examination is not that homogenous either. Finally, we have the Western Ukraine, which – due to historical traditions, when one or another region was integrated into one or another different state – demonstrates significant ethnocultural differences. This holds true for territories that had previously been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and for such territories as the Trans-Carpathians, Bukovina and the Lvov region that had historical ties with Poland. Even though the Ukraine is heterogeneous, on the whole what is most likely prevalent today is the tendency towards independence. We shall have to wait and see what the December 1 referendum on that issue will show.

Whatever the case, even if the Ukraine withdraws from the Union, economic chaos will afflict it to a lesser extent than, for instance, Armenia or Georgia, which is why it is freer as regards its choice.

The "scapegoats"

The Union's disintegration is pregnant with the emergence of public movements that will want to remind the erstwhile empire of its sins and omissions with respect to their particular people. It may well be that the national minorities will become the "scapegoats." I mean, more specifically, the Russian minority who number 25 million in all the republics, not 60 million as is now and again mistakenly claimed, due to the confusion between two figures, to wit the number of Russians outside Russia and the overall number of people living in this country outside their own national territorial formations.

In effect, the Russians living in the republic seceding from the former USSR need today not simply legal protection, but a very special form of socio-psychological adaptation. Depending on how well civilized the problems that arise are tackled shall we be able to gauge the standard of democracy and type of political regime in the new states arising on the ruins of the erstwhile empire.

I think there will be many flashpoints around the length and breadth of the former Union. We shall encounter virtually everywhere some degree of exacerbation and reinterpretation of national issues within the context of the economic crisis. Yet the current fragmented state of the Union will enable the self-governing territories and states to more efficiently tackle their humanitarian political and economic problems, without expecting "Manna from Heaven," that is from the erstwhile empire's centre, to wit the Moscow that was always viewed as the Third Rome, but which will never be the Fourth Rome. ■

NEW TIMES MAILBAG

Zviad vs. Tenghiz

"With the help of Moscow-based Georgian traitors, the Kremlin's infernal machine has gone into action. I exhort the Georgian nation to rise up and destroy these traitors." Thus spoke Zviad Gamsakhurdia. "I am willing to speak out and through rallies and demonstrations awaken the Georgian people and fell all enemies," he added.

We do not think there is any need to awaken the Georgian people. In fact, they have been heated up so much, that it needs but one more degree for the Tbilisi boiler to burst. Indeed, how far can this highly cultured people tolerate persecution of their intellectuals who are to be credited with great services to democracy? Just imagine – Tenghiz Abuladze, Rezo Esadze, Robert Sturua and Djansug Charkviani have been proclaimed "bad Georgians."

The democratic press, indeed every type of mass media, is harrassed should it, good grief, dare to censure the writer and translator Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The president wants to know by what right anyone dares to criticize him, the father of the nation?

Tenghiz Abuladze certainly has every right to warn his people of the resurrection of Varlam Aravidze. Allow me to share one thought that has long been with me. I fully accepted his *Repentance*, a film that touched me to the very marrow. However, one episode where Avel chucks onto a garbage dump in a gorge the dead body of his father Varlam seemed to me to be an oversight rather than a warning. For a uninterred body will, according to Christian tradition, give the dead man's soul no respite, causing it to go on haunting the world and tormenting the living.

Now though I realize the full strength of Abuladze's courage in having already then served a warning to both his people and all of us. I realize the full strength of Abuladze's courage, but what I cannot understand is the tacit silence of Russia's intellectuals. Again we forget that we should never wonder for whom the bell tolls...

No doubt the Georgian authorities will accuse me of interfering in the internal affairs of their sovereign state. But as they themselves have proclaimed the desire to join the European Community, they must therefore know that Europe has long admitted human rights to be no internal affair.

Gamsakhurdia has resolved to break off all relations with the USSR, which brings to mind the mayor of the city of Glupov (Stupidity) the noted Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin once described. He commanded America to be shut.

Andrei Cherkizov

Diplomacy closed for stock-taking

Our foreign policy has been suspended. In the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs building, some are looking for low-lying members of the State Emergency Committee, while others have resigned themselves to the prospect of being invaded by their counterparts from other republics.

In any civilized state with depoliticized state machinery, the former is an absolute impossibility. Political struggle in the corridors of the State Department can happen only in an American President's nightmare. The officials who disagree with the Minister's policy or the Minister who disagrees with his government's policy line resign their posts. In our country, which has been going through various stages of revolutionary psychosis for 73 years now, everything is still politicized or, to be more accurate, ideologized. As a result, time-serving is common in our officialdom.

Galina Sidorova

What about the latter? Are the diplomats who have lost heart right? Can a country which is already non-existent pursue a foreign policy?

In the early years of perestroika, it was foreign policy that pulled the USSR to the civilized world. Today the governments of the republics which have gained their statehood are seeking to expand their contacts with the outside world. The attempts being made to accomplish this are sometimes awkward and largely motivated by self-assertion. Under the circumstances, a central department in charge of foreign affairs could – by showing tact and supreme diplomatic skill – pay the unique role of a unifier, as it were, and correlate the foreign policy lines pursued by ten or so republics comprising the new Euroasian community. After all, can any economic union function at all without its members' foreign policies being coordinated?

It is not only by denying the Castro regime in Cuba further aid, and thus bringing the policy conducted over the last few years to a logical conclusion, that we can surprise and gladden the world, I think. We can also do that by rationally – and painlessly for the republics and their neighbours – fitting their military and economic policy into the world's.

The problem is that no one can tell as yet who in the near future will be regarded as a subject of international law – Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Byelorussia, or the community as a whole, and who will establish diplomatic relations with other states accordingly. Take Israel, for instance. Shevardnadze's policy, carried on by Bessmertnykh and rid of the last ideological fetters last August, has logically led us to the establishment of diplomatic relations with that country. But who is going to further those relations? When and how?

On the other hand, the Union still has international and bilateral obligations to fulfil. We have ceased to be a superpower. This does not mean, however, that we are incapable of contributing to the progress of the world community. The world's attitude towards us and the future prestige of the community largely depend on this contribution. The International Conference on the Middle East, which the US Secretary of State and his Soviet colleague have done so much to prepare, is approaching. The Americans are still working in this direction. What about us?

I think it is high time for the USSR Foreign Ministry and its republican counterparts to recover from their torpor and work out a concept of coexistence, to reach an agreement on the division of powers between them, and to determine which responsibilities should be entrusted to the republics and which ones delegated to the central ministry. It is true, however, that such a division of functions is possible only given a certain level of confidence between the contracting parties.

Although ministers are on parade in Moscow, Soviet foreign policy has been suspended

The republics are clearly showing special interest in their neighbours and in the states which, hopefully, may give them material aid – the Group of Seven primarily. The central Foreign Ministry might concentrate on the strategic aspects of foreign policy, on coordinating the actions of the community and other political and economic centres of the world, on global disarmament problems, as well as on those of nuclear, economic and ecological security. Why not pave the way for our republics' beginner businessmen expanding into regions which may prove to be rewarding investments for their future capitals, such as Africa, Asia, the Middle and Far East?

Like any Soviet department, the USSR Foreign Ministry has more than its share of redundant personnel. For objective reasons it was in Moscow – the country's only seat of higher education in the sphere of international relations – that the intellectual potential of diplomacy has been concentrated; the republics have yet to build up such a potential. Today our poverty-stricken country cannot afford to squander this potential on the basis of "political unreliability" tip-offs, as was the case in the past, or merely to reduce it by a certain percentage.

This week, ministers have been on parade in connection with the Moscow Human Rights Conference. Representatives from 38 European states, the USA and Canada were amazed to see the remnants of the habitual Union and the shreds of its foreign policy. Who is in charge of it, after all? This is all but the main question for them.

Judging by the fact that President Gorbachev has not offered the Foreign Minister's post to Eduard Shevardnadze, a natural candidate in the current complicated situation, he has decided to make foreign policy his own domain. However, while the President is engaged in "muckraking" in the great intra-Union divorce case, diplomacy has been closed for stock-taking, and foreign policy suspended. The pause drags on.

Russian speakers and Romanianists

Moldova, one of the first to actively speak out against the coup, was also among the first to proclaim its independence

Tiraspol's residents blocade the railway junction after the arrest of the Pridnestrovie Republic leader

Vladimir Solonar,
People's Deputy of
the republic of Moldova

It's a paradox but a fact: the text of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova left the readers ignorant of the limits of the new independence. "The Republic of Moldova," the document states, "is a sovereign and independent state, able to freely determine, without outside interference, its present and future in accordance with the ideals and sacred aspirations of its people *in the historical and ethnic territory of its formation"* (emphasis mine – **V.S.**). What does the last part mean? Judging by Part 3 of the Preamble, the text refers to all the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, that is to not only present-day Moldova, but to part of the Odessa Region (around 11 thousand square km) and to almost all of the Chernovtsy Region of the Ukraine (8.1 thousand square km), which was turned over to the Ukraine in 1940.

Part 6 of the preamble allows one to conclude that it envisions all the territory of the former Moldavian Autonomous SSR included in the Ukrainian SSR (8.1 thousand sq. km), which was set up in 1924 and dissolved in the 1940s, when six of the regions were given to the Moldovan SSR (3.5 sq. km) and eight to the Ukraine. Finally, Part 4 would seem to include all the territory of Zadnestrovie (Transnistria), as this name is usually understood to refer to the territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug rivers, which was under the Romanian governance of the same name in 1941-1944.

Thus, in its important constitutional document, the Republic of Moldova has formulated territorial claims to the Ukraine, the general size of which significantly exceeds the present republic's.

Russian speakers...

There are about 1.7 million people – Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzes, Jews and others – for whom the Russian language is of vital importance. Their situation, to put it mildly, is not enviable. Beginning from about 1989, their ethnic status in Moldova steadily worsened. In 1990 it became almost the norm to discriminate them on the basis of ethnic origin and language in hiring, promotion and education. The courts are inoperative in these cases, and the government of the republic flatly denies the existence of the problem. Emigration from Moldova (to where?) has become their dream. According to the latest public opinion poll, 29 percent of Russians and Ukrainians in Kishinev wish to leave the republic, 37 percent have not yet decided, and only 32 percent want to stay.

Despair and hostility towards the republic's government has enveloped a large segment of the Russian-speaking population. Feeling betrayed and forsaken by the Union government and the democrats, they placed their hopes on the emergence of a strong leader able to restore order.

...and the State Committee for the State of Emergency

For this reason the formation and actions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency was met with a sigh of relief. On August 19, telegrams of support were sent from the Tiraspol United Council of Workers' Collectives, several deputies, and citizens. Although the assertion that the Supreme Soviets of the Gagauz and Pridnestrovie republics supported the coup has since been negated by these bodies, there is no doubt that such sentiments were widespread.

This is a fact which cannot be refuted. It

can serve both as the foundation for ill-considered accusations against Russian speakers and their political leaders as being reactionary, and also for considerations of the deeper controversies dividing the country at present.

As in other republics, the Communist Party has been banned in Moldova and its property nationalized. The republic's newspapers, which published the documents of the SCSE (practically all Russian-language periodicals), have also been banned. The circulation of periodicals not banned by the putschists is also prohibited. These bans on the mass media, including those periodicals re-registered in Moscow, are still in effect. The Presidium of the parliament changed the entire staff of the most widely circulated Russian-language paper, *Soviet Moldova*, and has created in its place a new paper, *Independent Moldova*, which is more in line with the republican government's orientation.

The Beltsy City Soviet and the Taraklisky Region Soviet, among others, were dissoled for having opposed the enactment of the Law on Local Self-government, arguing that the corresponding changes had not yet been introduced into the Moldovan constitution.

On the night of August 22, Moldovan police conducted a large-scale arrest of deputies from Pridnestrovie and Gagauzia. There were 60 orders written out and 18 people arrested, the majority of whom were soon released. Among those arrested were the Gagauz leaders S.M. Topal, M.V. Kindigilian and, the Bendery City Soviet's Chairman G.F. Pologov. During the arrests, violence was used against the detainees, their family members and their neighbours. After this, the head-hunting continued. In Kiev, on the 28th of August, the leader of Pridnestrovie, I.N. Smirnov, was arrested as he was coming out of the Hotel Ukraina and taken to Kishinev. This was done without the permission of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry. The detainees were accused under Article 203 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova – acting contrary to the Moldovan Constitution and other laws of the republic. The accusation of supporting the coup was withheld due to lack of evidence.

Attempts to deal with mutinous republics under the pretext of "punishing the putschists" has elicited a powerful reaction. On September 1, the women of Pridnestrovie blockaded the Odessa-Kishinev railway. Later, the Gagauzes joined the blockade. At that moment it became clear that the sharp intensification of political controversy in Moldova is inevitable and bloodshed is entirely probable. The pre-coup situation of "neither peace nor war" seems now to be an unattainable ideal.

A pretext for unification?

Is the Moldovan government actually in earnest about its declaration of independence? The answer to this "blasphemous" question is not obvious. The road to actual independence is long and difficult. It necessitates the solution of many complicated questions about economics, defence and diplomacy, for example. Will the government, desiring to achieve independence, establish in its first document huge territorial claims to the land of its powerful neighbour? Will it conduct itself in a way which will deliberately promote worsening relations with that neighbour? It is not only Smirnov's seizure in Kiev, but also the open support of extremist organizations of Romanians in Northern Bukovina that troubles us so much. Nor is it entirely clear how the Moldovan government will prevent the republic's economic collapse if it refuses to take part in the State Council.

It is more than likely that the ruling circles of Moldova see their independence as a temporary, transitional stage in their unification with Romania. It is precisely for this reason that they do not plan to hold a referendum on independence as other republics are doing. If they conduct a referendum on independence, they will have to also hold one on joining Romania. While in the first case they can be sure of favourable results, it is impossible to say the same of the second case.

There is a fundamental conflict between the political orientations of the ruling circles of Moldova and the Moldovan general public. The leaders are influenced by the ideas of Romanianism and support an eventual union with Romania, while the people are categorically opposed to this.

Romanianism is a political ideology which can be reduced to the idea of a union of Romanians which transcends time and history. This union includes all Romanians (eastern Romans), as they are destined to be united within the framework of a unitary national state. Romanianism is manifested primarily as a revolutionary ideology directed at overcoming regional and other traditions in the name of the triumph of the national ideal.

The Bessarabian Moldovans, who have lived in both the Russian Empire and the Union state for one and a half centuries, have incorporated into their way of life a number of peculiarities which distinguish them from the Romanians in Romania, where Westernization has actively proceeded in the 19th and 20th centuries. This Bessarabian identity is the main reason that the plan for unification with Romania has found support in only a small part of the republic's population. However, included in this part are almost all of the Moldovan humanitarian intelligentsia who are sincerely committed to Romanianism and have a monopoly on the formation of the state ideology of Moldova.

The Bessarabian peasant is practical and conservative. While being very interested in his republic's opportunity to independently make decisions without seeking permission from the Kremlin on every point, he is also sceptical of the talk about independence, because he understands that Moldova will not survive without the union's common economic space. Until August 19, the republic's secession from the Union had not been decided upon. Moreover, a certain strengthening of pro-union forces was evident. The coup and the Ukrainian declaration of independence have drastically changed the situation. But it cannot be said that the attitude of Moldovans towards the plan to unite with Romania has also changed. The fundamental controversy in Moldovan politics remains.

It would seem that the radical nationalistic elements, currently setting the tone in Moldova, are also interested in the destabilization of the situation in the south western regions of the Soviet Union, as this would give them an excellent pretext to demand quicker unification with Romania. It cannot be ruled out that they are counting even on the disintegration of the Ukraine in order to realize their intentions. Drawing Romania into this conflict forwards the aims of the "extremists" of both that country and Moldova, although official Bucharest (still?) resists such pressure.

Meanwhile the strengthening of the republic's status as an independent state and its entrance into a unitary economic space is in the interests of the moderate forces in Moldova. However, these forces will recover and assert themselves only if the country calms down a bit, new structures are solidified, and orderly relations between the republics are established.

Flight from Nyuvadi

Early this August, the Azerbinform news agency reported deportation of residents of Nyuvadi, an Azerbaijani village in Armenia. Our special correspondent Nikolai KALINKIN has carried out his own investigation to elucidate the matter

According to Lilya Kaliyan and Alexander Kalashyan of the Yerevan-based Refugees Relief Committee, there are about 320,000 people seeking refuge in Armenia now, and no government documents can solve their problems.

"The decree On Compensating the Lost Housing and Property enacts that the bulk of payments should be made from the Republic's budget," says Kalashyan, "which amounts to paying out 1.2-1.5 billion rubles, or half the Republic's budget. Armenia has got only 50 million rubles for the purpose from the USSR budget, but even that sum has not been used up yet... And the price for housing has increased several times since then."

The situation with the refugees form the rural areas is less desperate. In fact, roughly an equal number of houses were left behind on both sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan. But Azerbaijani families are on the average much larger than Armenian families.

Out of 32,000 houses Azerbaijanians left behind in Armenia," Kalashyan continues, "14,000 were sold or swapped. The remaining 18,000 houses can make homes for 18,000 families, i.e. some 80,000 Armenian refugees. To sum up, the Republic today simply cannot provide housing for more than 120,000."

Formally, there are no refugees from Karabakh here: they prefer not to be registered as refugees, because they don't see themselves as such and hope to return, rejecting even the most attractive offers for settling down elsewhere in Armenia.

I met one such refugee (from Getashen) in Megri. He is already an old man and is very serious about his return to Getashen, and is currently a guest at his relatives', as he sees it.

Megri (which means "honey" in Armenian) is the Republic's southernmost part bordering on Iran. The region is famous for the fabulously sweet fruit grown there. It is the only place in Armenia where figs and pomegranates grow wild, like nettles in Russia. But orcharding is particularly arduous here, on granite rock and with scarce rainfall. Acres gained the hard way in the contest with rocky mountains and water are regarded here as the most valuable possession. Some local rivers meandering between mountains end nowhere: their water being used up for irrigation or just evaporating in the summertime heat. Dependence on water makes people settle in villages along the river, the only liveable area, which was occupied by man centuries ago and there is simply no other place to settle in.

Nyuvadi is in the Megri District of Armenia, 16 kilometres from Azerbaijan. The village used to be controlled by the Soviet Army, allegedly because of the importance of a railway two kilometres away. Even the regional administration representatives were not allowed there by a locally stationed battalion of the 75th Division of the KGB troops based in Nakhichevan. However, the military agreed to withdraw the battalion this summer, admitting that its presence there was not justified legally. Residents of the village left soon afterwards.

"People don't want to stay here"

Today Nyuvadi is an empty village. Enok Andreasyan, Chairman of the District Executive Committee, seems to be perplexed and offended:

"We took great pains to have the matter discussed with the residents. We made offers of profitable options. We also promised them free movement across the Azerbaijan border and said we didn't object to normal economic ties with the nearby Azerbaijan region. Moreover, we promised to build a road to Nakhichevan and actually started building it. Though it is Armenia's internal matter, representatives from the administration of the Zangelan District of Azerbaijan participated in the first round of the talks. We want a friendly dialogue. We didn't have any conflicts with our neighbours before.

"But the village's leaders chose a rather strange stance in the talks," continues Enok Andreasyan. "They rejected all our proposals, but didn't make any counter-proposals themselves. They only said that their people didn't want to stay here. I asked for a chance to speak to the villagers, but was refused. We were aware that people didn't know about our propositions. Their leaders were obviously pursuing their own goals. They spoke allegedly in the name of their people, but in fact, behind the people's backs. They just didn't turn up for the final meeting on July 15."

The District Committee doesn't have any special plans for Nyuvadi. First of all, it is necessary to see what can now be done in the case of 57 families which in 1988-89 swapped their houses with residents of this village, but couldn't come and live here because of the blockade. The further situation of the former Nyuvadi residents will be decided in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

"Press reports about deportation of the village's population are lies," says Enok Andreasyan. "The people left of their own accord. We can only guess their motives. Nyuvadi was visited by Polyanichko, Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, on two occasions within the last month. This person has a reputation as a troublemaker."

Says David Matevosyan, head of the district militia:

"The troops were pretending to protect the village despite the fact that there were no provocations from Armenians there. However, the village's chiefs claim they have official confirmation about 17 instances of bombardment. But there is no proof. True, an outpost was fired at once in the past. The incident was discussed with the military authorities and all agreed that the shooting was done by Azerbaijani militants closely connected with the manager of the Nyuvadi collective farm, Amanov. (Incidentally, Nyuvadi was the last collective farm in Armenia.) The militants' group was made up from locals and newcomers, even from as far as Baku. The group leader was also a stranger."

According to information from the military sources, the villagers had 10 submachine guns, two Degtyarev light machine-guns, approximately 20 carbines, and over 30 shotguns.

"Amanov was ruling the roost there," says David Matevosyan. "He alone was free to speak at the talks from the Nyuvadi side. If someone else spoke up and not to Amanov's liking, he cut the speaker short. Amanov himself was manipulated by someone behind the scenes, because he was obviously dependent on 'consultations' during the talks.

"I admit that there are militants on the Armenian side as well, but not in Megri, which is a small district where strangers simply cannot show up unnoticed. They came here on several occasions in the past, when the situation worsened, but each time we managed to talk them round



The Azerbaijani woman who stayed in Nyuvadi: there was no deportation... *Author's photo*

to leaving, assuring them that we ourselves were controlling the situation perfectly."

There are no other Azerbaijani villages in Megri, but a 48-km-long stretch of railway crossing the district is manned exclusively by Azerbaijanians, and no one attacks them.

"We repeatedly offered the villagers to form a regular militia force of 10-15 men to boost their feeling of security. We were even prepared to give them weapons. But their leaders rejected the offer. They again said: 'The people don't want it.' We learned later that Polyanichko visited the village July 23, and in the wake of this visit the villagers decided to leave when the troops left. They also decided to set their houses on fire and to shoot at Armenians. This showed a sharp change in the people's attitudes caused by Polyanichko's visit, which was repeated August 7...

"The army left the village August 8, and the residents followed the same night. Apparently it was not a decision made on the spur of the moment, because it is impossible to ship out all belongings, including animals and poultry overnight. But when Armenian militiamen entered the village, they found it empty. The Kurbanovs didn't have time to leave with the rest, and were still at the railway station. The family was persuaded to remain."

Armenian authorities clearly are interested in reversing that flight. It is important to maintain stable balance in the situation, besides residents of Nyuvadi didn't disturb anyone. The district's authorities believe that Nyuvadi could demonstrate the world that Armenians and Azerbaijanians don't have inherent enmity towards each other.

The Kurbanovs stay on

Megri and Nyuvadi are situated on the left bank of the Araks river, a borderline between the USSR and Iran, 25 kilometres away from each other. The left, Soviet, bank strikes one as uninviting. All along the bank one can see changes in the local landscape, introduced by the Soviet power which set in here as late as 1924, after fierce resistance was stifled: barbed wire and observation towers manned by armed border guards. Left-bankers can see that Iranians freely cultivate rice and vegetables right by the river, and even catch fish and swim in it. The era of Soviet perestroika introduced an experiment: citizens of the USSR are allowed beyond the barbed-wire fence every day between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to catch whatever fish remains after Iranian fishermen have finished.

As people are still not allowed to have gardens by the river, they have to grow vegetables and fruit in gardens way up with water supplied by powerful pumping stations, which often break down.

It was at one such station that I met Mekhti Kurbanov, who stayed behind along with his parents and sister.

"We have work here. No one tries to drive us away. On the contrary, we enjoy everyone's respect. My father is 65. So how can we leave our home and land?"

"Why did the others leave?"

"We know about the war in Karabakh from the TV and the press. People feared that as soon as the army left, Armenians would come and kill them. A general from Moscow visited us and tried to assure us that there was no danger in staying, yet our leader didn't believe him."

"Was your village ever attacked or shelled?"

"Nothing of the kind. There was a shoot-out up in the mountains, but no one knows who was involved in it. Two border guards were shot at and killed in a place 20 kilometres away, but this is all I know about the incident. The army left, and the villagers followed it at night. About half of the families went to live in flats they bought or got in housing exchange deals before. The rest live in tents somewhere in the Zangelan District of Azerbaijan."

Apart from the Kurbanovs, there is yet another resident in the village: a merry toothless old fellow. His Russian was bad, but good enough for us to understand his explanation of the reason for his merriment. He didn't want to leave with the others. Nor did he want to die a violent death. Therefore he decided to hole up. All of a sudden he found out that no one was going to harm him. Is it not enough to be happy and merry?

Feeling uneasy, I entered one house. Everything seemed to be in working order, including the electricity. The house itself was intact but empty of furniture. Peppers, beans, and tomatoes were ripening in the garden. Fruit would also soon be ready for harvesting. Some gardens, however, had begun to wither from lack of care and water.

I came to a borderguard outpost at the railway station. My questions could be answered only after a check of my pass and credentials. "Why did the people leave?" A commanding officer, lieutenant, says:

"It was Amanov who started all the trouble."

I produce a tape recorder and see my interlocutor's face stiffen. His voice becomes official in tone, but the eyes reveal the fear of someone at bay. After a moment of hesitation he decides to speak up.

"They left the village because they were poorly informed about the situation. It was partly the result of extremist propaganda, alleging that they would be victimized by Armenians when the latter come."

"Could you be more specific about what you call 'extremists'?"

"I'm not sure... Well, you read the press... There are differences between people of different ethnic origin, you know... There have been incidents..."

Later I learned that the lieutenant didn't know about the latest events in Karabakh, and even heard the name of the victimized village – Getashen – for the first time from me. What do the political education officers in the KGB borderguard troops get their salaries for? My question was:

"Were the fears of the villagers well founded?"

"They were not, judging from how an Azerbaijani family, the Kurbanovs, live here. They are brought food and helped generally. They don't complain and want to stay. I don't think there would be any problems if the others returned. The district's authorities guarantee their safety."

When asked about Armenian militants, the lieutenant just mentioned central TV reports.

* * *

My conclusion is that there has been no deportation in Nyuvadi. The flight of the people came as a result of urging from the village chiefs acting on commands from Azerbaijan, issued by people like Polyanichko, who had also orchestrated deportations of Armenians from Karabakh.

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The coup d'état: a failure fraught with consequences

Simon Kordonsky

The failure of the coup opens a new historic stage in the development of Eurasia. The Soviet Union's disintegration ceases to be a purely ideological process and becomes a geopolitical reality

The role of Gorbachev and his Cabinet of Ministers has lately consisted in trying to balance the interests of the Union's ministries and other bodies (including the Army, the KGB, and the Ministry of the Interior) with those of the territories becoming autonomous. Previously this was the prerogative of the CPSU apparat. The six years of perestroika were spent on the process of alienation of the property of ministries first in favour of the local Soviets and later of the municipal authorities. Here, as the coordinating role of the CPSU apparat gradually decreased, the imbalance of the national economy increased, which finally lead to a fuel, energy, transport and food-supply crisis.

The periodic changes in the President's position were largely explained by his having to balance the republican organs of power, which were gaining strength, and the ministries and departments which were losing property and power. The November events of 1990 showed that he was forced to yield to a certain degree to direct threats from the military-industrial complex and the Army which were trying to preserve the status quo in their relations with the republics.

The agreement to sign the Union Treaty meant a change of the status quo in the relations between the republics and the Union ministries and departments on such a scale that the government, and the high-ranking generals of the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior armed forces were practically removed from power. The instinct of self-preservation made the would-be members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE) resort to drastic measures.

Where were the headquarters? Three versions

There is no doubt that, apart from the clique members there should have been an operation headquarters which did the planning and coordination of practical steps. According to the first version, this role was played by the immediate milieu of the SCSE – their assistants, secretaries, and other trusted persons.

According to the second hypothesis, this same role might have been played by a group of amateurs of the Kurginyan brand who long ago offered their services to Valentin Pavlov, to the key figures in the repressive agencies and the CPSU Central Committee.

Yet, in our opinion, it is more plausible that the development of the coup plan was carried out by those sections of the CPSU Central Committee department of adminsitrative bodies whose duty was to control the Army, the KGB, the Ministry of the Interior and other special services. The supervisor of that department Oleg Baklanov, was a member of the emergency-rule committee and it would have been only natural if the coup had been worked out by bodies subordinate to him.

This last version does not exclude the first two. In any case, Kurginyan's epistles, as well as texts from the *Den* (Day) newspaper (edited by Alexander Prokhanov) were submitted to the CPSU CC "for information."

A plan of arrangements for imposing and realizing a state of emergency regime exists in every country and provides for a number of various measures ranging from preventive arrests and internments to disruption of communications systems and introduction of a restricted movement in the country. The relevant instructions are kept in safes of special departments of the KGB, the Ministry of the Interior, and the General staff. Imposition of a state of emergency requires coordinated activities of all repressive agencies and armed forces on each territory in question. These activities are coordinated by special local bodies of power – the so-called "provisional councils," which, before perestroika, were made up of the first secretary of the regional party commitee, the chairman of the executive committee of the local Soviet, and the head of the territorial KGB agency. In the course of perestroika the system of imposing a state-of-emergency regime was shattered. It is quite possible that the new leaders of local Soviets who headed them according to the instructions concerning the "provisional councils" were not properly instructed "for the reasons of secrecy."

The fall of the "provisional councils"

The organizers of the coup counted on the ability to control the system and the still existing strong vertical links to allow them to impose the state of emergency without much trouble, despite the changes made during perestroika in the system of local bodies of power. This is the salient feature of the mentality of the party and economic apparat characterized by unconditional submission to one's superior and the idea of mechanical manipulation of the inferior.

A special circumstance which, in our opinion, hampered the introduction of the state-of-emergency regime and possibly played the decisive role in the failure of the coup was that the

priority and scope of its introduction did not comply with the corresponding instructions. At the same time, the good intentions declared by the emergency committee members in their first decree presupposed a priority and range of actions entirely different from those necessary in the event of declaring a war or carrying out preventive repressive actions designed to defend the state system. The necessity to ignore instructions and the collapse of the system of "provisional councils," as demonstrated by the three days of the emergency regime, resulted in the inability of the KGB organs, Army units and Ministry of the Interior administration to coordinate emergency measures and neutralize activities of the coup opposition.

The leaders of local repressive organs were forced to come out against the leaders of local Soviets, i.e., against the nominal heads of state-of-emergency organs (according to the state-of-emergency instructions). Thus, the opportunity presented itself to the latter to mark time and finally to ignore orders from "above."

It is quite probable that a special role in making the decision of seizing power by the eight-man committee was played by the results of polls conducted by CPSU investigation groups and published in the *Glasnost* newspaper five days before the putsch: 79 percent of respondents in Russia, 86 percent in the Ukraine and 69 percent in Lithuania spoke in favour of preservation of state control over the majority of industrial enterprises in the USSR and did not favour the transition to a market economy. The pollees expressed their readiness to accept a hard power regime, provided it promoted "imposition of order." Let us recall that the attempts to "impose order" made in late October–November 1990 and the appeals to return to the leading role of the CPSU were also based on the results of a poll carried out by the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU CC ("Communists should come out of the trenches"). The poll showed at the CPSU still exercised sufficiently high authority, especially in the workers' milieu...

The main myth of the coup

According to a number of sources, the necessity of imposing a state-of-emergency regime dictated by the collapse of life-sustaining systems, a catastrophic shortage of energy resources (coal and oil), and the refusal of local agricultural enterprises to fulfil state food deliveries were more than once discussed by those around Gorbachev and in bodies of power subordinate to him. According to the Moscow radio, Anatoly Lukyanov, in his interview given on the second day of the coup, said that Gorbachev intended to declare the state of emergency after the Union Treaty was signed, in compliance with the "9 + 1" agreement. However, the signing of the Union Treaty would have automatically removed the emergency committee leaders from power and, according to the former leaders of the basic branches of the national economy, would have made economic stabilization and maintenance of life-sustaining systems impossible. The signing of the Union Treaty would have accelerated the disintegration of the USSR's single financial system and its economic space as a whole, and would have done away with the activities of the defence complex enterprises with their long technological chains embracing all Union republics.

It is necessary to mention the following events which, beyond and doubt, stimulated the attempted putsch:

1. Nationalization by Russia of the oil and gas industry and the promise given by Boris Yeltsin in Tyumen to raise domestic prices for oil and related products – the step which, according to Valentin Pavlov, would have exploded the entire national economy.

2. The contemplated introduction of national currencies in some republics. The suggestion made by the republics to divide the gold, diamond, and currency funds. The nationalization of the gold mining industry by Yakutia and Kazakhstan.

3. The failure to fulfil state deliveries of freshly harvested corn and the breaking away of the corn-producing republics from the common economic space.

4. The 50-percent cut of defence orders, the oncoming paralysis of the defence industry and social consequences of the ill thought-out conversion of defence enterprises.

5. The increasing commercializing of relations between leaders of large enterprises and sub-branches of the national economy, which would result in the abolishion of planned management methods.

6. Financial independence of leaders of enterprises and organizations and the ensuing loss of the last management levers.

7. Boris Yeltsin's departification decree under which the CPSU apparat no longer makes decisions in the fields of the economy and social life.

8. Establishment of republican security systems (including military formations and national guards) and the beginning of the transition of republican KGB agencies to the jurisdiction of the republics.

Even after the abortive coup many believe it necessary to impose a state of emergency. It is quite possible that it will be imposed, only in another form and by other leaders.

From our point of view, the main reason for the failure of the coup was lack of coordination between the activity of the SCSE and those organs which should have unquestioningly fulfilled all its orders. The supreme com-



manders – military district and arms in service commanders (possibly which a few exceptions) had not been informed in time about the forthcoming events and were not psychologically prepared to make firm decisions and to recognize the necessity of using arms on the territory of the Russian Federation, in Moscow and Leningrad. The commanders of the operative task forces and territorial troops of the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior had no instructions concerning what they were expected to do beginning on the night of August 19. There was a lack of coordination not only between the Army, the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior, but even between units of different arms in service. Special KGB units were unable (or unwilling) to fulfil the order of neutralizing the opposition. The strict control of the Army, KGB and Ministry of the Interior by the CPSU CC department of administrative bodies proved to be a myth.

It is particularly noteworthy that, according to some sources, certain controversies between the arms of the service turned into military opposition. In particular, the Air Force, headed by Marshall Evgeny Shaposhnikov, the present Defence Minister, refused to obey orders issued by the SCSE and, according to the general intended, in case of opening fire, to start operations against the KGB and Ministry of the Interior troops. One is lead to believe that it was exactly the absence of air support and a threat of an air attack (and not the crowd in front of the building of the Russian parliament) that forced the members of the emergency committee to mark time and finally capitulate.

The finale of the military events came when 80 heavy aircraft with airtroopers on board (their commanders declared that they supported the Russian government) landed on Kubinka and Zhukovsky airfields on the evening of August 20.

A special circumstance that hindered control of KGB and Ministry of the Interior troops was that these troops had been turned over to the repressive departments in the course of the Army reduction in 1990 and, evidently, neither the officers nor the soldiers were ready to act against the Russian-speaking population in the capitals of the country.

There was no one in the SCSE who was psychologically fit for the role of the leader of a coup. Moreover, all of them without exception enjoyed an invariably negative image among the majority of the population (in contrast to the departments headed by them, the polls showed that the attitude of a considerable part of the population towards the army and KGB as guarantors of social stability was really positive).

As for the (supposedly) genuine leader of the coup, Oleg Baklanov, he is a person known to no one.

The reaction of the world community to the coup was so quick and hard that it left its leaders no room to manoeuvre.

The differences among the leaders of the coup concerning neutralizing Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament gave the President of the Russian Federation an opportunity to aggravate the situation to the brink of an armed conflict, for which the plotters were, evidently, totally unprepared.

The horizontal links between leaders of local bodies of power, on the one hand, and the commanders of troops deployed on their territory and the bosses of local KGB and Ministry of the Interior agencies, on the other, proved a bit stronger than the vertical links of military subordination.

Drawing by Pyotr Yandane

Regional currency coming

There is no doubt that the centre has ceased to exist in its previous form. Now the scope and contents of power delegated to the President of the USSR and the organs that will supplant the Cabinet of Ministers, the Security Council, the Council of the Federation and the USSR Supreme Soviet will be determined by presidents of those republics which will sign the treaty of the Union of sovereign states. The Pesident of the Russian Federation has acquired a special status of the "first among equals" which, in its turn, will complicate the signing of the treaty.

Those republics which were not going to sign the treaty (perhaps with the exception of Armenia) will leave the new Union and, possibly, will try to form a sort of *cordon sanitaire* between the European Community on the one hand, in which the former socialist countries will somehow be integrated, and the states united by the new Union Treaty on the other.

The impending fuel, energy, transport and food-supply crisis may become the reason for a national catastrophe because of the collapse of vertical control at the Union level.

As a result of conversion, curbing production and sacking skilled personnel, the defence potential of the USSR will sharply decrease. Mass unemployment and the concomitant social tension among the defence industry employees will become reality. The process of establishing national armies, security services and law-enforcement bodies is being increasingly intensified in all the republics, maybe even in some regions of the Russian Federation.

Disintegration of the system of monetary circulation and appearance of not only republican, but even regional (in the Russian Federation) national currencies may become another reality.

The actual liquidation of the centre will enhace centrifugal tendencies, on the one hand, and the intensity of regional conflicts at all levels, on the other.

These tendencies – in case territorial national guards of local bodies of government are formed – may turn into interregional armed conflicts.

It is worth mentioning, however, that the growth of the power and authority of the President of The Russian Federation and the Russian government may considerably slow the disintegration of the USSR and stimulate integrating processes based on the transition of real power on territories of the Russian Federation to Boris Yeltsin's appointees.

How to share military heritage

Soviet military might has outlived the the integral Soviet state. How to prevent the collapse of the military structure?

Dmitry Trenin and Vadim Makarenko

After the events of August 19-21, we, all of us, are living in a "different country," as a current phrase goes. Each of us in his own country, it remains to add. The great country, Pax Sovietica, about which so many passionate words have been said, is no more. The end of the empire, however, inevitably means the end of the "imperial world" at the same time. In other words, "Pax," as well as "Sovietica," is on its way out.

Until now, the centrifugal tendencies, natural for the empire's declining years, were simply blocked by the centre. No serious effort was made to direct them into a less dangerous channel. As a result, after the protective dyke had collapsed, no bypass canals turned out to be near by.

All this fully applies to the sphere many have neglected until recently. What is meant are the problems of defence and, in general, of military security. Some thought them to be less topical than, say, those connected with the economic crisis and the stabilization of the country's finances; some believed that the existing military setup could be put on a "renovated" political basis. Today the Soviet constituent republics, which have declared their independence, claim jurisdiction over the USSR armed forces stationed in their territories, and start forming armies and national guards units of their own. Sovereignization is supplemented with militarization.

One of the aims of the abortive coup in the USSR was "to prevent the disintegration of the country," i.e., to restore its unitarian structure. The Soviet Army was to have been used as a tool for suppressing national sovereignties. Its divisions were regarded by young republican centres as immediate threat to themselves, and the republics acted accordingly.

It is only natural, in principle, that any state should guarantee its citizens' security against external danger and has the right to build up the relevant structures necessary for that purpose. A unitarian state has one army, but as it disintegrates into several states, each may have an army of its own.

A security treaty is needed

Sovereign states' striving for guarantees of their security is not only lawful, but fully justifiable.

However, the leaders of those countries ought to pay attention above all to the so-called "security dilemma," which consists in the fact that a nation's excessive concern for its own security makes its neighbours (and other nations) feel insecure and compels them to take countermeasures, which, in turn, provoke countermeasures... Outstanding border issues between republics having no armed forces is one thing, but if the republics in question have at least national guards and no agreement on defence and security, it is quite a different matter.

This is an inside view of the problem, so to say. And now let us look at it from the outside. International security depends to a tremendous extent on whether the situation within the nuclear superpower is stabilized. Unlike that of many empires of the past, Soviet military might has outlived the integral Soviet state. This is not only unprecedented, but dangerous as well. The international community has the right to be sure that the enormous destructive potential built up by the USSR is in responsible hands.

Now it is obvious that the solution of both problems lies in the speediest coming to an understanding on military matters irrespective of when the Union Treaty is signed. In our opinion, such an understanding should best be given the form of a security treaty, which would unite the states wishing to pool their defence efforts.

Such a treaty will take quite a long time to work out. We think therefore that before the future treaty provisions are agreed upon, republics should sign, within weeks form now, a provisional inter-governmental agreement on military matters.

A new defence council

As of today, all the republics actually form a military-political union inherited from the USSR. In a new situation, however, this



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

union is based on new principles: sovereign equality of its participants, a coalition character of the decision-making process, non-interference in the union member states' internal affairs.

If signed by the republics, a military agreement would give the rest of the world guarantees of continues centralized control over Soviet nuclear weapons, of the observance of the treaties, previously signed by the Soviet Union, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on strategic arms limitation, on armaments reduction in Europe, and of other commitments (troop withdrawal from Germany).

While confirming the integrity of the country's defence system, the republics could nevertheless reorganize the armed forces' supreme command system. Clearly, the decision-making process is the pivotal problem involved in such a reorganization. Considering the lessons of the recent attempted coup, the republics would be well advised to have the President of the USSR keep his post of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (which is especially important from the angle of international security) and to counterbalance this figure with an inter-republican defence council, guaranteeing security within the Union.

The council would become an authoritative and efficient body responsible for the elaboration and implementation of military policy, for the shaping of military doctrine, for army organization and, specifically, for personnel appointments. The authority of that body would be ensured by it being composed of the heads of the republics, and its efficiency by the continuous character of its work (between sessions, the council would function at the level of the republics' permanent representatives, and would have a secretariat of its own). Such a council could gather in session for dealing with any problem at any time.

In addition to the defence council, it would be expedient to set up an executive defence committee comprising the heads of the republics' military departments and an interparliamentary security committee.

Troops abroad: a new status

It is also necessary to determine the status of union troops stationed in the republics' territories. It is a matter of crucial importance to provide for the "transparency" of the USSR armed forces' activity for the leadership and the public of the republics they are stationed in. This is the question of such confidence-building measures as the endorsement of plans for the extra-garrison activity of troops and notifications of movements not planned in advance. Any movements of an army unit should be agreed upon with the given republic's authorities beforehand.

The personnel problem is of paramount importance. The appointments of commanders of Army and Navy units should be endorsed by the Supreme Soviets of the republics where they are to discharge their duties. In addition, the republics' governments should have their authorized representatives in the military councils authorized to exercise the veto in a number of cases.

A provisional agreement should provide for the joint financing of defence in the transitional period (before the security treaty is signed). We realize that such an understanding can be reached only in the atmosphere of maximum openness (within reasonable limits) as regards appropriate information.

Problems connected with conscription should also be negotiated.

Finally, the troops of the USSR Ministry of the Interior would be subordinated to the republics in peacetime. Exceptions could be made, at the republics' request, only for small mobile professional peace-keeping forces.

In our opinion, such an agreement, if signed and ratified, could prevent the collapse of the USSR's military structure. The outcome of negotiations as regards a security treaty would depend on the implementation of a provisional agreement.

As to the republics which have firmly decided against joining any new union, negotiations with them on military problems should be started immediately. These negotiations are to be conducted by the national leadership which is to rule the country in the transitional period.

The Soviet Union is departing from the scene without leaving a lawful legal successor. This is an extremely unstable situation. In his time, Winston Churchill commented on the disintegration of Austro-Hungary s follows: "There is not one of the peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the Habsburgs, to whom gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which ancient poets and theologians had reserved for the damned." In our case, the situation is much more serious. The prospect of a "war of Soviet succession" should be ruled out.



SECRET SERVICES

СНЯТИ КОПИИ КАТЕГОРИЧЕСКИ ВОСПРЕЩАЮТСЯ

Гриф секретности Совершенно секретно

Гриф срочности Срочно

ИСХОДЯЩАЯ ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА № 73218/32

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С 20.00 20 августа 1991 года 103 вдд, 75 мсд пограничных войск КГБ СССР, 48 мсд и 27 омсбр СК КГБ СССР подчинить Управлению по руководству специальными частями войск КГБ СССР. Указанному управлению обеспечить руководство служебно-боевой деятельностью передаваемых соединений.

В.Крючков

Председатель Комитета госбезопасности СССР В.Крючков

ПИСАТЬ ТОЛЬКО ЧЕРНИЛАМИ В ОДНОМ ЭКЗЕМПЛЯРЕ, ЧЕТКО, СЛОВА НЕ СОКРАЩАТЬ

The KGB and the putsch. Lubyanka's secret documents

SECURITY PROBLEMS

The nuclear button for two

The "strategic nuclear codes" in the putschists' hands. Who will control nuclear weapons in a new Union.

Regina Cohen CARP, an expert of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is interviewed by *New Times* correspondent **Alexander POLYUKHOV**

New Times. Soviet generals unanimously contend that during the coup the putschists had no control over nuclear weapons, though Mikhail Gorbachev had for a while lost command of the strategic forces and the army in general. Does it mean that the nuclear codes – the "strategic box" removed from the President – was not in the putschists' hands?

Regina Carp. Very little is known so far, first, because of the maniacal secrecy in the Soviet Union and, second, because the world did not think much about it before, trusting the ability of the Soviet political leadership to control nuclear armaments and the discipline of the General Staff in carrying out appropriate orders. In the past control was in the hands of the Communist Party and then in the hands of the Defence Council. But when almost the entire government and the Defence Council betrayed the commander-in-chief of the armed forces the chain of security measures was broken. The putschists did not dare shoot at the people, because the majority of officers and men did not support them. It would also be absurd to frighten the "domestic enemy" with nuclear weapons. This does not mean, however, that the putschists could not use nuclear missiles against the "external enemy."

In the usual situation the nuclear codes are of no use, because not only the President but also the Defence Ministry has to give the General Staff the order for a nuclear attack. A dangerous situation arose during the putsch. The codes were in the hands of the defence minister, who joined the junta.

N.T. I would also mention here the KGB chairman whose troops guard the missile bases and command bunkers and maintain government communication. He joined the junta along with the defence minister.

R. C. Indeed, KGB troops guard missile bases and nuclear warhead depots. Incidentally, targets of nuclear strikes, especially tactical, are determined with the direct participation of the KGB. In general, the nuclear bases and depots were guarded as usual during the coup. It is known that several years ago terrorists tried to capture nuclear explosives in Azerbaijan but were killed by KGB guards who were under orders regarding persons trying to seize nuclear warheads.

Terrorists do not represent a serious danger. Even if they get hold of warheads they will be unable to use them without the consent of the commander of a base. There is another course of events which would be terrible, and it became quite real during the coup. The generals with appropriate training could obtain nuclear weapons without the sanction of the commander-in-chief. It would then be easy for them to threaten with nuclear warheads or actually use them.

N.T. You probably have in mind tactical warheads.

R.C. As distinct from strategic nuclear weapons, tactical carriers are stationed everywhere and are not well protected. They are intended for daily use with conventional charges. Nuclear warhead depots are opened for troops only after an order from

above. We do not know the exact procedure. It is supposed to be much simpler than in strategic forces. After warheads are taken out of a depot it is extremely difficult, if possible at all, to control them. Fortunately, the coup failed very quickly.

The nuclear button ought not to be put in "trembling hands" (an allusion to former vice president Yanayev, a member of the junta, whose hands trembled during his press conference). Yanayev was unable to deceive the people. However, with the help of the defence minister he could have cheated the computer control systems of the command centres of the strategic forces.

N.T. We were told in the past that the double check system (on the part of the political and military leadership) is better than the American system under which the President can issue an order to the operators of intercontinental missiles and bomber pilots for launching a nuclear attack. It is clear now that in troubled times control on the part of commanders is very important in the Soviet Union. Perhaps it would be advisable to supplement the old system with some form of independent local control.

R.C. Everything in the USSR, including strategic command, is highly centralized. It was believed in the West some time ago that Soviet nuclear forces could be immobilized by annihilating the political leadership. For this reason the decentralization of control is partly advisable. However, the right to allow the use of nuclear weapons cannot be delegated to anyone. It must belong exclusively to the top political leadership. This is impossible to do, I emphasize, even in the present situation. The number of people having access to warheads must be strictly limited.

The State of Emergency Committee included several persons who had access to the nuclear arsenals. However, the risk of such a situation being repeated is lower than the risk created by enlarging the circle of people vested with "atomic powers." In turbulent situation malfunctions are more probable in the provinces than at the top level.

N.T. Boris Yeltsin demands a "second nuclear button" for Russia, the right to control thee nuclear weapons on Russian territory. How reasonable and realistic is this idea?

R.C. It is not a new problem. Discussions on double control over American weapons in Europe were held in NATO. Many people, first of all army officers, opposed the idea of a "double key" because the US President would lose hours or days in discussions with the allies about whether to use nuclear charges or not, whereas every minute counts in war. Nuclear deterrence against the USSR would become less effective. One-man strategic command is essential in a critical situation.

However, now that the cold war is over political considerations acquire greater importance than purely military aspects. In the case of the Soviet Union I have in mind internal political considerations. In NATO the problem has not been solved completely. It was agreed that, "time and circumstances permitting," the United States will hold consultations with its allies regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Some regard this agreement as a verbal exercise and others as a concession to European public opinion.

An agreement on similar consultations between republics could be achieved in a new Union. The question will certainly arise of the role of those republics which refuse to station nuclear weapons on their territory and of the influence of "nuclear" republics. Most of the nuclear missiles are stationed in Russia and its political leadership now has a decisive say. Control of the "nuclear button" will be transferred from the central government to the Russian President. The central government is so weak today that it is unable to push Russia to any action undesirable for it. Without Russia's consent it will also be unable to take any action.

N.T. Is a compromise possible, with Gorbachev and Yeltsin each having his own "strategic box"?

R.C. A compromise is possible, but it is not reasonable from the military technical point of view. Having gained the veto right, Yeltsin may ban a nuclear attack when Gorbachev considers it essential, and vice versa. The Soviet Union's deterrence potential will become very unreliable and the containment of aggression may be problematic.

N.T. Can the problem be divided into two parts: the Soviet Union's preemptive strike at the enemy will become less probable while its retaliation, in the event of a nuclear attack, will remain inevitable? As distinct from NATO, Moscow renounced, at least in words, the first use of nuclear weapons. The renunciation will now be consolidated technically.

R.C. The question should not be simplified. Nuclear weapons greatly differ from other armaments. The most effective means of averting a nuclear attack is deterrence by posing a menace, and this requires centralized command. The division of responsibility will decrease efficiency. At least this was so during the cold war. The political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have now improved and a very high level of deterrence is no longer needed.

In the interests of the Soviet Union's security it is more important now to find a balance between its republics and as politically acceptable formula of control over nuclear weapons than to maintain a high level of containment with regard to the United States.

N.T. In the opinion of the republics, nuclear weapons should be concentrated in Russia and the question arises of guaran-

Drawing by Igor Shein

teeing the security of the republics by nuclear weapons stationed in its territory. Will it look like the American "nuclear umbrella" over Japan and Western Europe?

R.C. You should be careful in trying to apply Western experience of this kind in Soviet conditions. The US practice of extending the sphere of containment to other countries relies both on geography and history. In Europe the American allies first felt the Soviet threat and then, by virtue of US military presence on the continent, became an object of nuclear guarantees from Washington. However, many people in Europe and America expressed doubts on this question.

I do not think that, say, the Ukraine will be subjected to US pressure to seek nuclear protection from Russia. In my opinion there is simply no more or less realistic possibility that such a situation will arise. For the purpose of dispelling the fear of Russia, the "elder brother," it would be advisable to remove tension by reaffirming that Russia is concerned with the security of other republics and is prepared to provide nuclear guarantees for them.

N.T. I do not think that a real or potential threat comes from the United States, at least today. However, there are more than a few smaller but more maniacal regimes which may try to annex fragments of the Soviet empire. I can recall Saddam Hussein, who forgot to congratulate Gorbachev on the failure of the putsch.

R.C. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out, but most likely nuclear deterrence will not be needed against trigger-happy elements of this kind.

N.T. Germany recently protested against France's siting near its borders short-range nuclear missiles and proposed that NATO promptly begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. How do you see the future of tactical systems in the USSR, since they cannot shell the territory of NATO from Russia?

R.C. There is certainly no reason for the Frehch to fire at Germany and for Russians to fire at Ukrainians. Generally speaking, it is absurd to deploy tactical weapons in the European part of Russia. In the interests of defence they should have been installed on the western border of the Ukraine (though the USSR has no enemies in Europe), not on the Russian-Ukrainian border. But what is logical from the military point of view is today impossible for internal political considerations, because the Ukraine has declared its desire to achieve non-nuclear status.

Therefore it is time to recall the "third zero" option proposed several years ago, or the complete withdrawal of not only medium- and short-range but also tactical missiles from Europe. In this case there would be no political will for such a decision, at least on the part of the West (let us recall at least the vigorous resistance of Margaret Thatcher). It is possible and necessary to secure the "third zero" option today.

N.T. It may happen that republics will express the desire to acquire some nuclear weapons, the same tactical missiles and artillery systems, for instance.

R.C. That would be the worst scenario. It is even terrible to imagine the emergence of new states which did not pursue and did not have their own foreign policy but gained possession of nuclear bombs. The nuclear non-proliferation process and world stability would be destroyed.

During the transition period, whatever the future of the Union or its different parts may be, it would be better to concentrate all nuclear weapons in Russia. Having renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, the republics should not remain face to face with a strong nuclear Russia whose leader, unfortunately through his aide, hinted at the possibility of revising the borders. On the contrary, they should be given instead the right to participate in control of the Union's nuclear missile legacy, at least in the form of consultations mentioned above.

The West, primarily the United States, should not wait for the results of the recently concluded agreement on the reduction of strategic armaments and for the outcome of the present ferment in the USSR. It would be more logical to start without delay negotiations on more substantial cuts in the nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States.

N.T. Will the United States agree to such cuts, even though it has always sought to remain the only superpower?

R.C. Yeltsyn and Gorbachev must immediately exert corresponding pressure on Washington while front page headlines in American newspapers like "Soviet missiles under control of the putschists" will help to give the White House a drop of sense. Experts understand that obstacles to a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons no longer exist. Incidentally, a drastic reduction requires the presence of central Union structures in the military and foreign-policy spheres. Having built up a huge strategic potential, the republics will make a mistake or commit a crime by refusing to decide its future together.

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Popular opinion in Israel

Still mistrusting the Palestinians, some 74 percent of Israelis prefer peace negotiations with their Arab neighbours

The mood in Israel today is not particularly expectant or optimistic with respect to attaining peace in the region. The Gulf War heightened Israelis' sense of insecurity; the daily SCUD attacks drove home the country's sense of insecurity; the daily SCUD attacks drove home the country's vulnerability. In fact it intensified a certain frame of mind that actually began with the intifada, and its daily violence. Israelis have had enough; there is a certain war weariness and a desire to be rid of the problem.

The increased interest in a settlement is not the result of a greater understanding or appreciation of the Palestinians' rights. In fact, hostility toward the Palestinians deepened as a result of their support for Saddam Hussein during the war was a sign of the PLO's continued determination to see the destruction of Israel and proof of the vacuousness of the PLO's 1988 acceptance of resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist. It is not love for the Palestinians then that motivates Israelis in the direction of peace, but the concern for Israel's future in a region besieged by the advancing technology of war. It is the need for a real location of the nation's limited economic resources, from the heavy security burden to sorely needed housing and jobs for hundreds of thousands of new immigrants as well as veteran Israelis.

This is a mood that can be felt even among right-wing voters, supporters of the Likud Party. It is reflected by middle-level Likud officials, led by a number of Likud mayors who recently called for negotiations with the PLO and even consideration of Palestinian statehood.

Post war Israeli public opinion polls indicate the continuation of what has been a gradual but steady trend in the past few years towards more moderate views. SCUD attacks notwithstanding, an overwhelming majority, some 74 percent of Israelis polled recently, said they preferred initiating peace negotiations over increased military capability in order to prevent future hostilities. This was a significant increase even over the 68 percent who expressed such a preference in 1987. Some 2/3 favored talks sponsored by the United States and the USSR, and 1/2 of the public even approved of an international conference under UN sponsorship. A group which represents close to 19 percent of the Israeli population, that is, Israeli Arabs (exclusive of the occupied territories) and kibbutz members – the vast majority of whom could be expected to support moderate positions – was not even counted in what was nonetheless a growing majority trend of support for peace and compromise.

Even as the country is split in party voting, 58 percent of those polled favored the principle of "territories for peace" – the most important principle underlying the possibility of negotiations and resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus rejection of this principle on the part of people advocating the idea of a Greater Israel is not reflective of the desires of the majority of the Israeli public.

Far more significant, however, was the startling rise (from 26 to 34 percent) in 1991 of those who said they were willing to see the creation of Palestinian state.

Only 12 percent favored maintaining the present situation, while a little of a third (36 percent favored annexation in one form or another, as distinct from the 52 percent who favored solutions ranging from autonomy to independent Palestinian statehood.

While a majority still opposes returning any part of the Golan Heights, it is noteworthy that this figure has declined over the past year, accompanied by a 4 percent rise in the number of people who are willing to compromise on the Golan. The issue of the Golan is purely one of security (and water). For the majority of Israelis security is the major factor determining positions, and, therefore, provided there are significant and satisfactory security arrangements, "territory for peace" is an acceptable proposition.

Whatever the particular outcome of negotiations with regard to borders, security arrangements, and the like, one thing has been clear and consistent, even growing in strength: the people of Israel want the opening of peace negotiations. They want to get on with the resolution of the conflict, rejecting almost totally the continuation of the **status quo**, favoring compromise over extreme nationalism, indeed viewing security in terms of peace rather than expanded military power. If Israelis believe, as they did after Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, that there is indeed a genuine opportunity for an accord with the Arabs, namely Syria and the Palestinians, they can be counted on to support the move. They can be counted on to translate this into a political will and even to make sacrifices for it, as in the case of the peace treaty with Egypt.

This is not to say that distrust is not high, on both sides, but peace agreements are not built on trust. They are built on realism and, if they are to last, self-interest.

The Golan Heights: an Israeli soldier observing Syria. He's a long way to demilitarization
Photo by France Presse

Galia Golan, Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a Spokesperson for Peace Now, Israel's Zionist mass peace movement

Ups and downs

The same White House, which was repeatedly blamed by Stalinists for the disintegration of the USSR, tries to check the headlong exodus of Soviet republics from their former Union

Between golf and fishing from a motor boat in Kennebunkport in the northernmost state on the Atlantic coast, President Bush adopted some important decisions about American-Soviet relations and gave press conferences on the lawn of his family's country house. At a recent news conference, the US President announced the recognition of the independence of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and called the "ten plus one" agreement on a new association of sovereign republics and Gorbachev's support of their right to determine their destinies themselves a watershed in Soviet policy.

Americans did not spend much time admiring the triumph of democracy and freedom in the ex-bulwark of totalitarian communism. Right away they got down to an analysis of that triumph's significance for the Soviet Union and for international politics. Americans believe that the tree of democracy is delicate and needs constant and painstaking care, both in their own country and the rest of the world.

Is it a "Yugoslavization?"

The downfall of the last empire in human history evokes a feeling of satisfaction from Americans, as well as from the people of the USSR. (According to expert opinion, the world's first empire was built in Assyria in the 9th–8th centuries B.C. And now, 3000 years later, the era of empires has come to an inglorious end.)

However, most American politicians, public figures, businessmen and experts believe that the downfall of the empire is not yet a pretext for an immediate secession of republics from the ex-Union and their traversing alone the stormy ocean of world economy and politics. In their opinion, to ensure a relatively smooth transition to a market economy, to a truly democratic social system, and eventually to complete independence, it is necessary for most of the former union republics, above all Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelorussia, to unite in some way.

The Americans fear a "Balkanization," or rather, a "Yugoslavization" of the ex-USSR, that is, territorial and ethnic conflicts. Possible chaos in the huge country rife with nuclear weapons becomes just another nightmare of world politics. The putschists' seizure of the President's nuclear codes increased the fear of Soviet nuclear weapons, although President Bush stated that the American administration closely watched all developments connected with those weapons and there was no reason for anxiety so far.

With tremendous relief and hope the United States welcomed the "ten plus one" agreement on a new community of Soviet nations, the approval voiced at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR concerning new Union's structures which will help retain a joint military and foreign policy, and the resolution that nuclear weapons will remain under the control of those structures.

It seems that Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has found the most radical way. He has suggested a new version of a great deal: substantial aid to the Soviet Union in exchange for the destruction of all or a greater portion of Soviet nuclear weapons. Perhaps there is logic in that, because such a deal would spare us the trouble of finding purchasers for warheads, as we are looking now for those who could buy rocket carriers and other space equipment.

Notwithstanding excessive restraint in the matter of economic aid to the Soviet Union, particularly before the victorious revolution, President Bush, US Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft now pursue the most farsighted and well-considered policy towards the USSR in light of its internal processes of disintegration. There are several reasons for that. First, the awareness of the tremendous responsibility of the United States for the world's future and the enormous significance of Soviet developments for the future world order. Second, the opportunity for the United States, geographically and historically remote from Russia and other republics, to calmly and unhurriedly analyze the possible courses of action. Third, the vast foreign policy experience and the even temper of President Bush are of no small importance. Time and again President Bush speaks about the special responsibility of the United States, and warns against any steps taken merely for effect.

The White House offered the Soviet parliament an opportunity to recognize the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia before their recognition by the United States. (Unfortunately, the Soviet parliament did not avail itself of that opportunity.) The Americans make no secret of the fact that they marked time and spoke about various kinds of technical problems to be tackled by these republics to meet the criteria of an independent state so as not to give a "false signal" to other republics and in order to dispel their hopes for quick recognition of their independence. Moreover, Washington emphasized that its recognition of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was a special case, because the United States had never agreed to their annexation, and that other Soviet republics could not expect the same treatment.

To sum up, the same White House which was repeatedly blamed by Stalinists for the disintegration of the USSR tries to check the headlong exodus of Soviet republics from their former Union, or at least tries not to inflame passions. Of course, some people might note that Washington simply does not urge on a runnign horse. To my mind, though, the White House has much more complex geopolitical and even moral considerations than a primitive desire to deal the final blow to the defeated ex-enemy. Apprehensive as it is of the consequences of a possible chaos in our country, the United States is concerned about the following problem of principle: what offers greater chances for democracy to survive and further develop – a voluntary community of republics or individual independent states of the ex-USSR. The opportunities for the

latter cannot be considered too promising, judging from the example of Georgia and its leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Politics: emotions and standards of behaviour

Before our very eyes anxiety for the future of the USSR has brought about a change in the attitude of people towards Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev. The courage and resolution of Boris Yeltsin have won him admiration in the United States. Americans consider Russia's leader on a par with General Schwarzkopf, hero of Operation Desert Storm. This admiration has been lessened of late because of disappointment over Yeltsin's somewhat light treatment of the principles of a rule-of-law state and his lack of political tact, which has added to the tensions in the republics, already aggravated by the putsch. Faint critical notes appeared at first in private talks and then in the press. For instance, *The New York Times* titled its editorial "Yeltsin: Democrat or Autocrat?" True, Yeltsin's speech at the Congress of People's Deputies has again enhanced his prestige in the United States.

I tried to explain to my American friends that certain roughness and unevenness in the behaviour of Gorbachev and Yeltsin during the first few days following the abortive putsch had resulted from their psychological state, no matter how different the experience of each of them had been during those turbulent three days. My explanations were useless. The opinion of my American friends was that a politician should remain as such under any conditions and should behave accordingly.

As events keep developing, Americans more and more frequently look to the Soviet President as the one who can play the leading role in saving the Soviet Union from utter disintegration, due to his political ingenuity. The results of the Congress of People's Deputies are regarded in the United States as a notable success of the Soviet President, who has again shown himself to be an expert at political compromise, who has managed to unite independent republics at a critical moment when they were already to part, possibly for ever.

Having returned from the USSR, US Ambassador Robert Strauss emphasized in a characteristically diplomatic manner that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were cooperating closely. Within possible limits, the US President continues to support and to pay much attention to the Soviet President. These are sober-minded political ways, not President Bush's certain particular personal bias, as zealous conservatives and liberals allege. The kind feelings, which the Bush family entertains towards the Gorbachevs are of major but secondary importance here.



A cartoon from The Cincinnati Post

To lend a helping hand

The wish to increase aid to the Soviet Union keeps growing stronger every day in the United States. It reflects tremendously warm feelings towards victorious democracy, confidence that now a quicker transition to a market economy will begin, and fear that in the event of growing economic dislocation reformists will become scapegoats and the danger of a new reactionary dictatorial regime might appear.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, has fueled the argument of whom and how to aid, and whether it is possible to remedy the current Soviet situation of collapse now that the Union has in fact disintegrated.

I interviewed Professor Padma Desai of Columbia University, who said:

"I have devoted 25 years of my life to the study of the Soviet economy. I cannot imagine that the republics would be able to cope single-handed with the ocean of depreciated money. It is clear that the financial situation in the country can be stabilized only by carrying out uniform and tough credit and finance policies and preserving a common currency. The naivety of republican leaders in the fields of economy and finance looks frighful to me. And what about Western aid? Humanitarian food aid can be distributed among republics and regions. But what assistance can be given for the transition to a convertible ruble? To whom should credits be given? And who will repay them? Individual republics? One or several of them, however, by pumping up a mass of money to finance its swollen deficit can undermine the attempts of other republics to stabilize their financial conditions."

Influential Democratic Congressmen Richard Gephardt, Majority leader of the House of Representatives, Les Aspin and Senator John Danforth suggested that a USSR aid fund be established at the expense of the Pentagon. Mr Les Aspin even mentioned the possible amount of 1,000 million dollars. President Bush complimented the Congressmen on their constructive idea, but did not support it.

The White House declared that it would not leave us in the lurch, but that it would be unrealistic to expect it give us bank cheques gratis.

During the meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom, shortly before the latter's visit to Moscow, it was decided to give food and medical aid to the USSR.

More aid is envisaged in the event of radical and concrete steps towards a market economy and the reduction of military expenditure, which is excessive for our poverty-stricken country.

Washington made no bones about the fact that other types of aid and assistance, in addition to humanitarian and technical ones, could be given only when it would become more or less clear what would be built on the wreckage of the USSR. The leading idea of President Bush on the score is, "Let them first sort it out themselves."

Evgeny Rusakov,
our own correspondent
NEW YORK

General Jaruzelski's place in history



Wojciech Jaruzelski has already gone down in 20th century history. Historians will give different appraisals of his activity – some as a "European Pinochet," others as a man who saved the nation from fratricidal war, still others as a shrewd politician who opened the way for dialogue with the opposition and public concord. However, some will associate his name with the collapse of the socialist system, accusing him of indecision and inadequate firmness in the struggle against class enemies.

Below Wojciech **JARUZELSKY** recalls the past in a talk with *NT* correspondent **Rudolf BORECKI**

More than three years ago, Vitaly Ignatenko, then Editor-in-Chief of *New Times*, and your correspondent were received by Wojciech Jaruzelski, the party and government leader of Poland. An account of this meeting was published in the magazine. Returning to a new Poland a short while ago, I often thought of meeting with him again. An arrangement was made simply, without any journalist ruse. I phoned Wojciech Jaruzelski and asked for an appointment. After a brief pause the general said, "Tomorrow, if it suits you. I'll be expecting you by noon."

The quiet Icarus Street, consisting only of a dozen houses concealed by luxuriant trees and shrubs, fancifully winds through the very centre of Warsaw. I approached a modest two-storey house behind a lattice fence. A robust young fellow – one of the guards, as I understood – saw me to the drawing room. The general, slight and graceful as usual, dressed in an elegant suit, offered me a cup of strong coffee. Having paid compliments to him, I began my interview.

Let me digress a little from the purpose of the meeting. With all the spontaneity of the interview (Jaruzelski did not know the questions or even the subject of the conversation) and the unbiased character of such a genre, those who ask questions cannot but form a subjective image of the person who is interviewed. The same happened to me. The further we delved into past events, the more clearly I formed the image of a profoundly intellectual, critically thinking and highly considerate man. I tried to explain to him, perhaps clumsily, that now I understand why he, after he had resigned from the presidential post in December 1990, again won the sympathies of compatriots, becoming one of the most popular political leaders. But the general shrugged his shoulders and tactfully brought me back to "business," as he said.

New Times. After our previous meeting in 1988, *New Times* published an interview with you. The central question of that interview was the possibility of reforming socialism. We met half a year before the "round table," a year before political power was changed. Was your affirmative reply an expression of belief or the necessity to go the whole length of it?

Wojciech Jaruzelski. I expressed my belief, which I also hold today. It may seem paradoxical in light of the latest changes. But if one considers the question seriously, he should realize first what socialism means. It can be understood as fidelity to certain basic values, such as social justice, equal conditions for starting out in life, freedom of the individual, and the efficiency of social production which, true, requires methods different from those used under so-called real socialism...

N.T. You are talking about some ideal socialism, which we did not know...

W.J. This does not mean that we should not try to put the ideal model into effect. It is one thing to believe in supreme values, and another thing to be ready and willing to translate them into life under concrete historical circumstances and at the present level of our thinking and experience. I still think that the social system, which relies on the above-mentioned moral standards, discards former distortions and mistakes and uses the best achievements of other social systems, could function if the leaders had enough courage and flexibility to renounce obsolete dogmas in good time. References are often made to Marx. It is forgotten, however, that one of his cardinal principles was to doubt everything.

Some time ago we brushed the theory of convergence aside as a purely bourgeois attempt to slur over the contradictions between socialism and capitalism. I shall not go deep into the philosophy of this question. While preserving the basic values of the socialist system, it would be quite reasonable and, I think, feasible to use political, social and economic mechanisms that could make it democratic and effective. Does parliamentary democracy contradict the ideas of socialism? Does a market economy contradict the ideas of socialism? The only debatable issue is one of property. Perhaps we were too much of doctrinaires in this matter (though the private sector has always existed in Poland and even predominated in agriculture). However, we should not make a fetish of private property. It is much more important to provide equal opportunities for all forms of property... Let them prove their viability in the competitive struggle. The strongest blow to socialism was dealt, in my opinion, by a stupid and bureaucratic approach to the question of building it.

N.T. You believe in the ideals of socialism, though "the first land of victorious socialism" has caused much grief to your relatives and you personally (deportation to Siberia and forced work on timber-felling sites).

W.J. Let us recall first that the ideals of socialism had their origin on the banks of the Rhine and the Thames, not the Volga or the Amur rivers. The progressive and humane elements of these ideals, harmonious with the well-known dreams of mankind, remain in force. Many people far removed from socialist ideas by their descent or life-style joined at one moment the revolutionary process on the side opposed to their former life-style and descent. I am not an exception, but one of the examples of such a choice in life.

N.T. I have in mind not so much the force of attraction of the socialist idea, since the thirst for it can be understood, as the tragic fate of your parents and your bitter experience of life in the pioneer land of socialism.

W.J. All this depends on whether man can rise above his resentment and hardships. I do not in the least want to look like some hero who has buried his bitter and painful past in oblivion. I have been cured of the disease of hatred by the Russian people, for I felt not only the morbid nature of the system, but also the kind attitude of ordinary Russians, Soviet people, to us people evicted from their land...

N.T. From what place and where were you resettled?

W.J. My mother and sister and I were deported from Lithuania to the Altai territory. My father was then arrested and exiled to a camp in the Krasnoyarsk territory. After the signing of an agreement between Stalin and General Sikorski, my father was released, and he found us in the Altai. Several months later father died of emaciation. He was a strong, robust man. When he returned to us, he weighed a little more than 40 kg. Mother and my younger sister returned to Poland in 1946.

N.T. Nevertheless you fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Russians, who had brought so much suffering to your family...

W.J. The life of everyone, and my own life, is often governed by chance. Had we not fled from the Germans to Lithuania and had we not been exiled to Siberia, I would have certainly joined the Resistance, the Armia Krajowa, (the part of the Resistance movement under the control of the émigré government in London – **R.B.**), and would perhaps have shared their fate.

N.T. You want to say that after the war you would have been thrown into camps set up in Poland not without Soviet participation?

W.J. It would have apparently been so. However, I was not able to join the army of General Anders which then fought on the southern flank of the Allies – in Africa and Italy. We were in the remotest depths of the taiga when it was formed. We did not receive news and in particular, news about the Anders army. When we reached the city of Biisk, the army was about to leave Soviet territory through the southern border. As a result, access to it was virtually closed for me. Only one possibility remained, namely, to join the army of Berling. I joined it consciously, as a Pole who was given the possibility to fight against the Germans. It was a natural impulse in my

soul. I did not think of whether we should fight side by side with the Russians. We knew against whom to fight, and it was the most important thing for me.

My views were then shaped spontaneously and, to a great extent, under the influence of events and the people who surrounded me. One more thing. There were books. Every time we returned from our timber-felling site in the taiga, I checked a book out from the local library and learned Russian. I learned to understand Russian literature, a great literature. At first I understood every fifth and later every third word, and finally I felt that I could read freely. Sometimes I read all night long by the light of a wick lamp. As a result, my eyesight worsened. As time passed, I began to understand what is called "the secret of the Russian soul." I began to understand better the customs, morals, and manners of the people around me. We felt hungry, and it was cold. We felt morally depressed. But there were also experiences which warmed my heart.

Later I finished the Ryazan infantry officers college and went to the front. Soviet soldiers and officers lived, fought and died beside me. Their destiny was also my own destiny. The past was not forgotten. However, its former black and white contours seemed to have been diluted.

N.T. Could you say more about your family roots? Perhaps some episodes in the past and family traditions played some part in shaping your personality.

W.J. It will, perhaps, be difficult to find some direct connections here. My grandfather, also Wojciech by name, took part in the 1863 revolt against tsarist Russia. He was not sentenced to death after the revolt had been crushed only because of his young age. My grandfather was exiled to Siberia for 12 years, and he served his term not far from the city of Shadrinsk. He was released eight years later under an amnesty. My maternal grandfather barely escaped the gallows during the Red Army's offensive on Warsaw in 1920. In the same year my father voluntarily went to fight against the Bolsheviks. So anti-Russian and later anti-Bolshevik sentiments had a sufficient base in our family. School education and literature of the interwar years also "worked" in the same direction. I had no contacts with the left. In general, a pious and patriotic atmosphere prevailed in our family. No wonder I was sent to study at a Catholic gymnasium.

As you understand, my first encounter with Russia did not bring me anything good either. Nevertheless, my direct impressions did not coincide with the demonic images of "Russians" and "Bolsheviks," with wich my head had been stuffed in the past. Perhaps I intuitively felt a gap between the cruelty of the regime and the sympathy of people in your country. I saw that the rule, "I am chief and you're a fool, and you're chief and I'm a fool," was used in relations between higher-ups, not between those who, like me, worked hard and starved. I learned to distinguish the pathology of the regime from the national character, from ordinary people.

Luftwaffe bombers over Warsaw in 1939

...Our family belonged to the nobility, and thus material welfare was regarded as a natural state of affairs. Thanks to the family upbringing, and especially to the beneficial influence of my mother, I felt sympathy for the unfortunate even as a child. This sympathy for the misfortunes of other people was made deeper by my early acquaintance with the novels of Konopnicka, Prus and Sienkiewicz. This readiness to help other people stemmed more from human compassion than from an understanding of social injustice. Much later, when I was in Russia, I came to realize that the "natural state of affairs," that is, the property and social inequality of people, is not at all primordial and can be amended. There was, of course, nothing attractive in the fact that all of us living in the taiga were equally poor and hungry. But from the moral point of view, such "equality" seemed fairer than the contrasts I saw at home before the war. I have in mind not so much material contrasts as the humiliating social status of the poor, their psychological depression and permanent feeling of inferiority. Perhaps in my democratism I would never have gone farther than simply a humane impulse of my heart, had I not found myself ill bestead in a foreign land. During the war, adolescents matured quickly and found their place in life. A man's descent, as happened in my case, could come into conflict with his outlook.

N.T. So when the war ended, you were a 22-year-old officer of the victorious army. Shortly after that you became a member of the Polish Workers' Party, that is a Communist. It was normal and even obligatory for everyone who held a more or less noticeable post in new Poland. Has your attitude towards the Communists changed in the subsequent 40 years?

W.J. I joined the party in June 1947, when I attended the higher infantry school, an advanced training centre for officers. Immediately after the war, I, like many of my colleagues in the Wojsko Polskie (Polish Army), took part in operations against the Ukrainian nationalists and armed groups of the Polish underground movement in the south-east part of the country.

The higher infantry school was a new stage in my political education, more rational and systematic. Lessons were then conducted at a rather high professional and intellectual level. It was favoured by the social situation in Poland between 1945 and 1948. In the early postwar years, Poland looked for its own way to socialism. Later, the party leadership headed by Gomulka paid dearly for these searches. As is known, they ended in the defeat of the "right-wing nationalist deviation." In 1947, the political situation and the social climate in the country remained relatively democratic. It is indicative that both Soviet and Polish specialists taught in the higher infantry school. Among Polish specialists, there were many career officers who served in the army before 1939. I recall with equal appreciation my Soviet teachers, Colonels Litvinov, Dmitriyev and Lobachev; Colonels Szmatowicz and Rukiewicz, Poles by birth; and my teacher-compatriots, who formed a greater part of the teaching staff.

The higher infantry school was headed by Gen. Olbrycht, who was awarded this rank before the war. After him the school was headed by Gen. Florianowicz, who held the rank of colonel before the war. I mention this to show that these teachers instilled in us not only professionalism and military knowledge, but also high cultural standards inherent in the finest oficers of earlier times.

A meeting between Wojciech Jaruzelski and Pope John Paul II in 1988. Both took part in the Resistance movement during the war

The removal of these people from active social life and direct repressions against some of them were a tragic mistake. I recall the commander of the regiment in which I served right after the war. He was a lieutenant colonel before 1939. He knew military science well and supported the new regime in Poland. It is impossible to call him "a fellow traveller." As a true patriot, he sincerely believed that the new social order would be better and more just than the regime of prewar Poland. Of course, the tragic experience of the September 1939 defeat, assessed by the majority of people as the bankruptcy of the sanatio regime, played no small part in the consciousness and destiny of people like my former regimental commander. Incidentally, the harsh sentence passed on prewar Poland was made less painful by us many years ago. Today it has to be revised completely. I also think that the present total negation of the country's postwar development will be replaced by a sensible and balanced approach...

So our elder comrades, Poles and Russians, passed the necessary knowledge on to us, veterans of the war. As for ideological education, it had nothing in common with the indoctrination characteristic of subsequent decades. It was still a time of hot political discussions. The higher infantry school also had such a discussion forum. Students and teachers gathered for free dialogue. There was no division yet between those who served in bourgeois Poland, those who fought in the ranks of the Armia Krajowa, and those who had arrived from the Soviet Union. We were united by the principle "he who is not against us is with us."

It was also important that relations between the new authorities and the Church were more or less smooth. Sometimes the leadership specially pointed to the role and significance of the Church.

The situation began to change in 1948 and 1949. The government took a tougher stand towards the Church, thereby alienating a large part of believers from itself. Though the political struggle continued ceaselessly, the parties lost their independence and the doctrine of "leading role" finally prevailed. The authorities began to suppress initiative in trade, in small and middle businesses, and in agriculture. Had we consistently followed the road chosen after the victory, recognizing the multiparty principle in politics, the multiplicity of economic forms, freedom of conscience and so on, we would have built socialsim as a more humane and just system which we earnestly wanted to create on the ruins of the bankrupt prewar regime.

Between 1945 and 1948 radical social changes were favoured not only by Communists. Many politicians, far from communist views, also condemned the prewar leadership for the preservation of the semi-feudal societal structure, for its inability to avoid a war, and for its dubious foreign policy...

The situation in the West also differed from the present one. Sympathies for the Soviet Union were then strong not only among workers, but also among leading scientists and cultural personalities. The Communist parties enjoyed high prestige. But the West could not serve as an example for us. It had discredited itself by its colonial policy and predatory wars. Internal stability in the capitalist countries was often upset by mass social disturbances. All this made us confident that we had chosen the right path.

Later, when doubts appeared, there were events which kept up or revived our belief. The launching of the first Soviet satellite, the space flight of Gagarin and other successes seemed to demonstrate the progressive nature and superiority of socialism. In addition, the rates of industrial growth in Poland were higher than in other countries... Since we restored the country, built giant industrial enterprises and digested the western territories within a few years, why should we follow the example of the West? We abolished social inequality, declared war on mass illiteracy and made higher education accessible to children from poor families. These arguments convinced us that we had adopted the right path and were making a breakthrough into world civilization. It was therefore natural that I joined the party which initiated the changes worthy of respect and support. A characteristic feature of that time: the commission which admitted me to the party consisted of a Communist with a prewar record of underground work, a career officer of the old army, and a person of the same age as I.

(To be continued)

WARSAW

HUMAN RIGHTS

Legal space on the territory of a former empire...

The Conference on the Human Dimension is taking place in Moscow as planned, but in a changed land...

Lev Timofeyev

No conference can ensure the observance of human rights. Freedom of speech in Uzbekistan cannot be guaranteed by French Foreign Minister Dumas just as Secretary of State Baker is unable to solve the South Ossetian problem. Conferences of this kind do not settle concrete problems. They are held to confirm universal principles, to remind the peoples and governments that these principles, for example those proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are obligatory for the situation in Uzbekistan, for the solution of the Ossetian and other problems.

The recognition of these principles and even the signing of appropriate documents does not yet mean that human rights will be observed. The Soviet Union ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the Helsinki agreements a long time ago. However, the former Soviet leaders told blatant lies when they spoke about their adherence to humanitarian principles. They lied by saying that there were no political prisoners in the USSR, that only criminals were held in Soviet camps. They lied when they said that they guaranteed the freedom of citizens to leave their country and come back. For decades they denied people the right to emigrate. They lied by proclaiming the right of citizens to a decent standard of living, freedom of religion, speech and political choice.

Paradoxically enough, the lie of the Communists was proof of positive changes in the world. The oppressive regime could no longer commit violence disregarding world public opinion. With the help of lies the Communsits wanted to worm themselves into civilized society. But they did not succeed.

The regular, even planned exposing of lies spread by the Communist rulers began in the latter half of the 1970s, when the Moscow Helsinki Group was formed. In spite of repressions to which the first organized human rights champions were subjected (camps, prison, exile and banishment from the country), their efforts gave rise to the international human rights movement (the Helsinki movement) unprecedented in its scope, and to the establishment of an international public body to observe how international agreements in the human rights field are carried out by the governments which signed them.

The international public mechanism of control over the observance of human rights can be successfully used in our country today. Now that the Soviet Union is disintegrating, such a mechanism could be an important guarantor of universal human values for its peoples.

It is now clear to everyone that the USSR has never been a uniform cultural, historical and legal entity. The cultural, religious, political and legal traditions of Estonia and Tajikistan, Lithuania and Kirghizia, Azerbaijan and Latvia were so different that the peoples of these republics opposed and resisted the inhumane pressure of the communist doctrine in their own ways. As democratic reforms began in our country, these distinctions were manifested more clearly. The possibilities of the rise and growth of democratic movements, organizations, parties, and democratic structures of state power in the republics, which were once European states, and the republics in which the communist doctrine was closely interwoven with oriental despotic traditions over the past 70 years are quite different.

Also different were the forms of resistance of the outgoing authorities to the growing democratic changes of the past few years. The dramatic events in Vilnius and Osh, Riga and Ferghana, Tbilisi and Sumgait had equally tragic but absolutely dissimilar plots.

Human rights are a universal concept in today's civilized world. The rights and security of national minorities, even the largest of them – Russian minority, and the entire complex of human rights must become an important object of interstate relations in a new community. The Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension offers a splendid opportunity to proclaim the supremacy of international over national laws in the human rights sphere and to ensure control over the observance of these laws.

Lev TIMOFEYEV is a member of the Moscow Helsinki Group and of the Executive Committee of the International Helsinki Federation

Conspiracy as a form of madness

Professor **Erwin RINGEL** is the head of the world-famous School of Viennese psychoanalysts, director of the Institute of Medical Psychology in Vienna, and honorary doctor at leading universities in Europe, America and Asia. Below we publish an interview he granted to *New Times* correspondent in Austria, **Anatoly Kovrigin**



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

New Times. Much has been said about the political, economic and social motivations which led the conspirators to stage a coup. How does a psychoanalyst account for their actions?

Erwin Ringel. They acted mainly out of fear. The plotters were afraid of losing what had just recently seemed so stable and important. Power and privileges were also at stake.

N.T. You are a recognized physiognomist, and I know that you spent those days in front of the TV, observing the main characters. How would you define their state?

E.R. When I saw the faces of the putschists at the evening press conference on the first day of the coup, I drew a firm conclusion: with such leaders there could be no victory. They were stiff, ossified people, whose dimming eyes and forced gesticulations gave away their insecurity which bordered on despair. They even conveyed panic fear. It can be supposed with a great degree of assurance that we were dealing with people with psychological defects of varying seriousness. In any case, the conspirator Number One, a man with trembling hands, should long ago have been sent to a doctor for a medical examination.

N.T. And what can be said about the President?

E.R. I confess that I was literally stuck to the screen when they showed Mikhail Gorbachev's return from the Crimea. To me as a psychotherapist, it was obvious that here was a man in a deep depression. This impression was confirmed by the coverage of the President's meeting with the members of the Russian parliament. It is just understandable that Gorbachev suffered greatly, both in the political context and personally. He could not have avoided feeling responsible for the changes started in the country and for his relatives and others close to him. I immediately understood that Gorbachev needed help, a good psychotherapist who could help him restore his faith in a better future and renew his vital strength.

N.T. How long will the "August syndrome" be with the President?

E.R. It's hard to say exactly. It is characteristic of man to make mistakes. Life consists of mistakes and the lessons we learn from them. But as regards Gorbachev, it would be wrong to speak only of blunders. He does not need to either pat himself on the back or repent. Let the putschists do that.

N.T. Nevertheless, in the President's address there was an avalanche of reproaches from both the right and the left. In such circumstances, how long can one "hold the punch," to use boxing terminology?

E.R. I don't think that Gorbachev is threatened by a knockout. It is evident from his latest speeches that he is recovering, taking up his former dynamic and decisive politics. Of course, much depends on the way the situation develops and on the actions of his main partners and opponents. To the latter I want to say in particular that one should not drive the President into a corner. His exit from the political arena would mean a great tragedy. What he needs now is help and the support of true friends to enable him to shorten the time needed to recover form the psychological crisis he has suffered. Of course, Gorbachev will never be quite the same as he was before the coup. But he can become a new Gorbachev, a man sure of his strength and capable of doing more good deeds.

N.T. From your point of view, what lies ahead for this country? Will you take the risk of doing a psychoanalysis?

E.R. It is clear that the situation has turned out to be a very dangeorus one. Your people are suffering bitterly. They are worn out by an existence which I would describe with the medical term "disguised life," i.e., there is a façade of calm and contentment, while inside, there is bitterness and hostility. The mainstays of the system are collapsing. After the coup, the pace of the collapse has quickened, and under such circumstances there is great danger of a massive counteraction. The combination of anti-Communism and nationalism harbours a huge explosive force.

N.T. The father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, wrote back in the early 1920s that the communist experiment could hardly be victorious, because the party was demanding unconditional faith and absolute submission. But Freud wrote that in order to believe, you must be on your knees. It would seem that his prophecy has come true. What do you think about this?

E.R. The question of why capitalism was destined to triumph over communism is a very interesting one from a psychological point of view. If you cast aside all secondary reasons and meaningless gibberish, thus dealing with the bare truth, it is possible to propose the following formula: capitalism stems from the idea that man is evil and greedy by nature, desiring to conquer his rivals and be the first and the best. Communism is based, or maybe it's better to say would like to be based, on the idea that man is good and that justice and equality are inherent in him. Lenin came to the conclusion that people can and should be forced to act properly and be good. It is mainly this assumption that forms the basis for the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therein lies the problem of the four-sided circle, so to speak. It is impossible to force anyone to be happy against his will, and to achieve this by way of coercion.

VIENNA

Shock therapy

Valentin Petrushin

Can society be afflicted with a mental disease – schizophrenia, for instance?

Can society become mentally ill? If so, what are the symptoms of that illness, and how is it to be diagnosed? To what kind of treatment does it respond?

The well known Soviet psychiatrist, Ye. Krasnushkin, wrote that the so-called schizothymic trait was clearly discernible in the culture of ancient Egypt with its "mysterious symbols and holy beasts"; that this trait was cyclothymic in "merry" ancient Gréece; and that in "iron" Rome it was of an epithymic nature.

Each of these learned terms designates a certain type of behaviour which even the uninitiated can easily identify. Schizothymics are people immersed in the world of their own ideas which they often arrange into symbolic and abstract patterns. Schizophrenia, which may be triggered off by infections, emotional shocks, or physical injuries, results in autism – the patient's desire to shut himself off from the outside world; this detracts from his activity and initiative, impoverishes his emotional life, and robs him of the capacity for logical thinking. The paranoid form of schizophrenia is accompanied by fixed delusions of grandeur or persecution. However, in cases where a patient retains his intelligence and his ravings sound verisimilar, he may long give the impression of being a person who holds rather unusual views on life, that's all.

Cyclothymics' mood periodically changes from happy excitement to melancholic depression. Combined with a lack of moral principles, adventure-seeking may sometimes land a cyclothymic in the dock. In a fit of depression, a cyclothymic is sick at heart, uneasy, and thinks of suicide.

Epithymics are distinguished by pedantic neatness and perfectionism. Their mental processes are slow, hence their thoroughness and their obsession with ideas which psychiatrists refer to as "supervalent." Epileptics are now sweetly obsequious, now revengefully ruthless. Like paranoia, epileptic psychosis may be accompanied by un unrestrained striving for power and megalomania. An epileptic may imagine himself to be a messiah, God's own envoy to earth, a prophet or a great reformer. Epileptic cases are exteremely persistent, punctual and rancorous.

The hood syndrome

What kind of a special mental state has our society been in over the past 73 years? The most accurate description of this mental state is "paranoid schizophrenia." Suffice it to compare our country's home and foreign policy in the stagnation period with the symptoms shown by a schizophrenic.

Our land of socialism surrounded itself with the notorious "iron curtain" intended to prevent the subjects of victorious socialism from comparing their life with that of citizens in other lands.

Isolation and seclusion, alienation from the international community, discouraging any free contacts – all this is reminiscent of the "hood symptom" well-known to any psychiatrist and displayed by patients afflicted with a simple form of schizophrenia who pull their jackets over their heads in order to shut themselves off from the outside world. The great German psychiatrist Bleuler regarded that symptom as the key indication of schizophrenia. The very term "schizophrenia" means a **split** personality. The schizophrenic's thinking proceeds on two or three planes simultaneously: he may see one thing and talk about something else while experiencing feelings totally unassociated with the things he sees and talks about.

And now let us take a look at our own public life from this angle...

Declarations made by our leaders for all the world to hear sharply contrasted with the contents of secret circular letters for service use, and their practical politics were something else altogether. International conventions on human rights were signed against the background of unceremonious human rights violations at home; dispite professions of fraternal love for socialist countries, secret agents were recruited there by the KGB; while chauvinism was condemned, Russian-language schools were introduced everywhere – by force, as a matter of fact; the rhetoric about the Soviet state's peaceful intentions was accompanied by an unprecedented increase in military spending...

I am writing about this lack of logic in the administrative command system's policy not in order to reproach it, yet again, for its hypocrisy, but rather to illustrate the dangerous clinical symptoms of schizophrenia it displayed.

A world enveloped in flames

During times of totalitarianism the contradictory nature and lack of common sense inherent in our society's emotional life manifested themselves in



the touching concern the authorities showed for Spanish Communists' children while ruthlessly maltreating the children of "enemies of the people" or those who, suffering from starvation, picked up a few wheat ears in a collective farm field. The hysterical demands yelled by frenzied crowds in the thirties that "enemies of the people" and "turncoats and traitors" be shot indicated the same pathological aberrations in the public mind due to a loss of emotional sensitivity and compassion. Notably, the so-called State of Emergency Committee, which sent tanks and armoured personnel carriers onto our streets and was prepared to shed the blood of unarmed people, "touchingly" promised in one of its early documents to reduce the price for children's clothes.

There are two more symptoms confirming our diagnosis. One of them is megalomania.

The leaders of the revolution believed themselves to be prophets who had come to this world in order to accomplish the great mission of emancipating the proletariat, and proclaimed the year 1917 the beginning of a new era in the history of mankind. The three-day rulers of August 1991 differed but little from their "revolutionary" predecessors in this sense. Their megalomania manifested itself in pompous slogans and arrogant speeches. Imperial ambitions were obviously shown in the national emblem with red banners resembling tongues of flame, squeezing like crab claws the globe which was supposed to sympolize the revolution, with Communists as its moving spirit, of course. It was implied that "Soviet" meant the best and the most just.

This was combined with persecution mania also known to every Soviet citizen only too well: failures to carry out all sorts of unrealistic projects were ascribed to "saboteurs" and "agents of imperialist intelligence services" out to destroy the young Soviet republic and to foil all its daring plans. The atmosphere of fear and suspicion, the feeling of being continuously spied upon, fueled by slogans like "Be vigilant: the enemy is not asleep," "Be careful not to talk too freely over the phone, a chatterbox is a godsend to a spy" – these and other masterpieces of Communist propaganda permeated our life

for years. As a matter of fact, those were paranoid ravings which spread from the top through all the strata of society. A person who has grown up in a rigidly authoritarian society begins to show symptoms of schizophrenia sooner or later.

The principles of totalitarian rule were based, above all, on human beings having been considered a means of achieving various production targets, or "cogs" of the state machinery. All over the country, experts were at the beck and call of their incompetent chiefs, Party ideologists, who went by the principle "I'm your superior, and you're a fool." Those who ventured to have it their own way were inevitably punished for that ("any initiative is punishable"). Such a system of governing suppresses the individual and, consequently, makes him susceptible to schizophrenia.

"We Soviets have our pride!"

The scenario whereby the public mind becomes infected with a virus of mental pathology goes as follows. A group of revolutionaries aspiring to power carries out a social upheaval under cover of lofty slogans and unleashes a campaign of terror in order to suppress its opponents. This results in society's moral and economic regression. Subsequently, the country falls under the rule of a totalitarian regime which does not mind its officials' incompetence so long as they are loyal to it and which runs the country in a way which causes deformations in the public mind, economic decline, and a resultant drop in the standard of living.

Among the symptoms of schizophrenia, psychologists list a low level of self-esteem and self-respect. Although we have long lived under the slogan "We Soviets have our pride and our honour," it turns out upon inspection that total alienation from the means of production and work results leaves the Soviets little to be proud of.

According to the American psychologist James, one's personality is formed by what one can call his own. My house, my family, my business, my car – for an ordinary American these are not only status symbols, but essential components of his personality as well. In our country, people were underpaid, and even the most efficient workers had only medals and diplomas of honour to boast of. This certainly wounds their pride.

A cult of poverty and humiliating supplication was privately encouraged in Soviet society over the lifetime of three generations, which made people obedient and dependent on state handouts in all spheres of life. Many regarded themselves not as independent and free individuals but as persons subordinated to all sorts of hierarchic structures – external forces alien to them. This attitude is akin to a symptom of schizophrenia.

Psychologists attribute the loss by our people of sympathy for one another to a low level of self-respect. Hence, probably, our irritability and lack of understanding. The notorious uncompromising and "principled" positions Soviet representatives took at various international negotiations came from the same pathological inability to put ourselves in other people's shoes.

Psychologists say that paranoics have an insufficient level of self-knowledge and are not shrewd enough with regard to their actions. The recent events in our country have shown that under certain circumstances lack of shrewdness may be salutary. Who knows what the attempted coup would have ended in had the conspirators been more provident?

Quite often a person, blind to his own shortcomings, is prone to project them onto others. This probably applies to international relations, too. A major arms trader, the Soviet Union always accused Western countries of "pursuing the aggressive policy of imperialism."

Treatment

Today our society is emerging from the twilight state it has been in for years. We have rid ourselves of the "iron curtain" and are becoming an open society; we have all but forgotten about megalomania and are no longer preaching at other nations; persecution mania is gone, although current perestroika is still sometimes regarded by certain quarters as the result of foreign secret agents' efforts. Now that the historical truth has come out, however, a substantial portion of our society is bitterly disappointed by what the "achievements" of the totalitarian regime have proved to be.

Public passiveness, noted by many journalists recently, has been confirmed by sociological studies. In a 1991 public opinion poll, 99.4 percent of those interviewed said that their idea of happiness was being on pension. This is just one indicator of the comatose state our society was in.

The moral spirit of society is not a figment but as much of a reality as the nation's intellectual potential and the country's natural wealth. Impressive as the plans and recommendations suggested by economists and financiers for our country's revival are, none of these plans will work until people come to believe in them. Pushing a demoralized country to go free market is like urging a heart case to run a marathon, or a diabetic to feast on a chocolate cake.

To begin with, we must realize that for all the horrors of our recent history we have plenty to respect ourselves for and to be pround of. Isn't it impressive that over the past 73 years we have kept our sanity and are still capable of sound reasoning?

We are neither the first, nor probably the last, to be ruined and morally degraded by historical developments. After World War II, Germany and Japan were in a similar state which, however, served as a psychological springboard of sorts for their subsequent rise.

Curing social schizophrenia is a process as long and often as agonizing as that of curing an individual mental case, and as Seneca put it, "In order to become healthy, you've got to suffer first." Shock therapy is regarded as the most effective cure for schizophrenia. A monstrous shock like the attempted coup was necessary, perhaps, to expedite our recovery. ■

Those treacherous galoshes,

or why reform the KGB

Leonid Ionin

On the eve of the coup attempt, I purchased in the Political Books store a drab-looking pamphlet, *A Manual for Agents of Extraordinary Commissions.*

The subtitle said: "Published by the Volyn Gubernia Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Profiteering, and Abuses of Office." It was a facsimile of the original publication. Its authenticity was evidenced by a black stamp, saying: "The All-Union Lenin Library. Special depository."

The booklet stands a chance of becoming a bestseller today, when the KGB, the heir to the glorious Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), has turned into the country's most popular organization. Its officers and ex-officers are much sought after by press interviewers, their individual and group photographs have become objects of great interest. Prosecutors inspect office interiors and say many fascinating things are to be found there.

The KGB has become more popular than the CPSU, with which it used to vie for popularity before, because the CPSU is breathing its last, while the KGB is subject to reform. What's more, the KGB is dividing under our very eyes like an amoeba gemmating into small but viable "KGBlets," each of which is probably also subject to reform, but in the meantime is merely separating democracy-minded personnel from those who display conspiratorial tendencies. The number of democrats is surprisingly large. General Kalugin is no longer the black sheep in the KGB family: now hosts of KGB officers are boasting in chorus about the secrets they have divulged, regarding this as a criterion of commitment to democracy.

In such an unstable situation there is a need for clear-cut instructions – and the booklet I have mentioned provides just that. I think it ought to be republished, with phrases like "a fiery revolutionary" and "a champion of the cause of the proletariat" replaced by "a fiery constitutionalist" and "a champion of the cause of democracy." Apart from these changes, the text can be reproduced word for word. For instance, a KGB man is a fiery constitutionalist, pure in heart, alien to petty-bourgeois interests, remarkable for his moral fortitude and strong will, and vigilantly guarding national property. The booklet contains a practical suggestion as to how national property should be guarded: "A Cheka man should be remunerated for his services in such a way as to make him dependent and to prevent him from resorting to blackmail."

Next comes an extremely useful recommendation having to do with personnel policy: "As long as a Cheka man is not convinced that those at large engage in criminal activity, he is not ripe for investigation work."

And here are recommended ways to suppress counterrevolutionary (this adjective should be replaced in the new edition by "anti-constitutional") conspiracies: "An inquiry should be instituted when there are sufficient grounds for it, such as tip-offs, rumours, etc."

Our newspapers warn us that we are to be prepared for a lot of conspiracies. Some even predict that things will begin to happen next January. The present situation is indeed almost exactly like that in the year 1918: economic disarray, near-famine, and a very cold winter expected. This is a paradise for conspirators. As for the grounds for instituting an inquiry, such as tip-offs and rumours, they are already widespread, and I don't understand why no action has been taken on them.

Some may say that I am just wasting my breath, that the KGB's latest instructions are much better thought-out and more thorough, and that the necessary inquiries are already instituted by those authorized to do so. This is true, of course. But in reforming our glorious state security agencies any source of wisdom is useful, let alone that of pure original wisdom which one can partake of without fear of defiling oneself.

There is another reason why the book should not be merely re-published, but circulated in millions of copies. You see, it opens with a chapter entitled "Rules of Security," which explains how to select a secret address, where to keep hectograph ink, and who to be particularly wary of (janitors and keepers of furnished rooms).

All this is divided into paragraphs. Paragraph 38 contains an extremely important warning: "Do not attach your true initials to your galoshes. This could give traitors a cue to your identity."

I wondered whom the booklet was meant for until I found the explanation in Paragraph 45: "Those who are to attend a congress should, shortly before its scheduled opening day, adopt a low profile and even change their appearance and address."

Now I see... Remember Lenin, alias worker Ivanov? Obviously, the security rules found their way into instructions for the Cheka agents right from a pre-revolutionary Bolshevik manual for underground workers.

The papers say that the Central Committee has already gone into underground session in the Ukraine. Its members gathered at a secret address and discussed the situation. They did it spontaneously, I am afraid, and without the proper order and system in their work. They didn't remove otheir true initials from their galoshes; nor did they change their black Volga limousines' registration number plates and hide their hectograph ink and their linotypes in good time.

An end should be put to all this nonsense. The state ought to help its Bolsheviks by printing this brochure in an edition equal, at lest, to the number of those who have not withdrawn from the Party. Because if they don't learn the rules of security, they will not be able to organize conspiracies, and if they are unable to organize conspiracies, there will be nothing to expose, and if there is nothing to expose, then what's the use of keeping the KGB, and if there is no use for the KGB, then why reform it?

To conclude, here is another excerpt from the booklet which goes to show that it has lost none of its topical importance for the KGB reformers: "All the pay tariffs are to be regarded as provisional in view of the high cost of living in Moscow."

What did Stalin and Hitler agree upon in 1939?

Lev Bezymensky

On September 6, 1991, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia proclaimed their independence. Documents from German and Soviet archives throw light on how and when they lost it

Do we know all that happened 52 years ago, when the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed? Of course now we know more than before, and this is the historical merit of the commission headed by Alexander Yakovlev and set up by the First Session of the People's Deputies of the USSR. The Soviet people learned about the secret protocols and grasped the meaning of the pact. Yet the commission, bound by its mandate, passed judgement only about the pact of August 23, 1939 as such, leaving aside its consequences.

But when the question of the Baltic republics was raised, two points of view came into conflict. According to the first, although the pact was legally invalid, there was no question of "sovietization" of the Baltic states. Others believed that their annexation by the USSR was already a matter decided upon. The controversy remained unsolved, for neither of the sides could produce sufficient documentary evidence.

Now we have it.

The night of August 23

As evidenced by eyewitnesses, when Ribbentrop, upon his arrival to Moscow began a general discourse on the evening of August 23, Stalin interrupted him impatiently, saying, "Enough, let's discuss the protocol." Ribbentrop conveyed the German suggestion: the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union will include Finland, Estonia and the eastern part of Latvia (with the border running along the Daugava River). The western part of Latvia and Lithuania must become part of the German zone of interest. Instead, the whole of the East Poland will belong to the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Stalin objected: he categorically demanded that the winter ports Libava (Liepaja) and Vindava (Ventspils) to the west of the Daugava border should be handed over to the Soviet Navy. Ribbentrop, having no authority to make decisions on matters like that, had to consult Hitler. The session was adjourned. Ribbentrop urgently got in touch with Hitler's Bavarian residence Berghof via Berlin, from where a succinct answer came to Moscow: "Yes, I agree."

Some historians believe that Stalin didn't realize on that evening that he might have demanded from Hitler whatever he liked. For instance, Stalin silently agreed then with the transfer of Lithuania to the German sphere. It was only on September 25 – already after the war had begun and the Red Army had invaded the Western Byelorussia – that Molotov summoned Ambassador Schulenburg and in nearly ultimatum form blurted out Stalin's suggestion to him – to "exchange" eastern Poland for Lithuania, with the latter being transferred to the Soviet sphere.

No doubt, it's exactly this line of Stalin's behaviour that led to the inference that the idea of "sovietization" of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was maturing as early as August 23. On the other hand, why should it be a question of "sovietization"? For, creation of a neutral strategic underbelly near Leningrad would have been sufficient even if the approach of the Wehrmacht to the Soviet borders had seemed inevitable. I must confess that such was my assessment of the intentions of the Soviet leadership. And, judging by the newly discovered documents, I was mistaken.

Molotov, Hilger and Ribbentrop

The night of September 27

The most difficult thing for a contemporary historian when assessing the situation in 1939 is the continuing dearth of Soviet documents. Of course, the situation in this respect is better now than it was before 1985, because the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided access to many diplomatic documents for both Soviet and foreign scholars. At present, Volume XXII of *The USSR's Foreign Policy Documents (1939)* is being prepared for publication, for which the most profound gratitude is due to the authorities and fellows of the Historic and Diplomatic Department of the Foreign Ministry. But these are no more than diplomatic documents! It's common knowledge that under the conditions that existed at that time the foreign policy service only fulfilled the directives of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). And where are these directives? Kept secret. It only remains to hope that now they will be declassified.

For the time being any trifle, any evidence is invaluable. This is why so overwhelmingly important is the discovery made by Dr. Ingeborg Fleischauer, the greatest expert in that period. She found a typewritten version of talks that took place between Ribbentrop, Stalin and Molotov on September 27-28, 1939. It was kept in the personal archives of Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, German Ambassador in Moscow, in a time-tainted file, inscribed in the Ambassador's own hand "Documents personally related to me." A corresponding Soviet version is not available (and is not found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry). As for the German one, nothing was known about its existence until recently. It was prepared by Counsellor of embassy Gustav Hilger, who was also the interpreter. His mastery of the Russian language was perfect (he was born and studied in Moscow), and he was well versed in the art of compiling documents of that kind.

Dr. Fleischauer has recently published the Hilger memorandum, numbering many pages (simultaneously in *International Affairs* in Moscow and in *Viertelsjahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich, which is particularly pleasant to note). Here we are specially interested in the passages related to the Baltics. So what was said in Moscow on the night of September 27? What did Stalin say then?

The Baltic topic was touched upon very soon, namely when Ribbentrop mentioned that the pact had given much to the USSR ("the outlet to the Baltic Sea") He emphasized that it was important for Germany to know "when and how" Stalin was going to solve the whole complex of problems concerning the Baltic. Hilger's notes read:

"Stalin said in connection with the Baltics that the Soviet government had demanded that the Estonian government should concede bases in Estonian ports and on the islands of Oesel and Dago for the Soviet Navy and Air Force. For the purpose of protection of these bases, the Soviet government will deploy in Estonia one infantry division, one cavalry brigade, one armoured brigade and one air brigade. All these activities will take place under the guise of the Mutual Assistance Treaty between the Soviet Union and Estonia. The latter's consent has already been obtained."

In fact, at the time of Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, Karl Selter, Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also there. He had arrived to sign a trade agreement, but the main topic of negotiations became the incident in the Revel port – the mysterious disappearance of an interned Polish submarine, which the Soviet government interpreted as a "threat of subversions in Baltic waters." Unexpectedly for the Estonian Minister, he was offered a mutual assistance pact which, inter alia, provided for deployment of Soviet garrisons in Estonian bases. The Estonian leaders gave their consent, believing that the pact would become a means of securing "peaceful cooperation" between the Estonian people and the peoples of the USSR (as President K.Päts put it).

We read further in the Hilger memorandum:

"When asked by the Minister whether this meant that the Soviet government intended to accomplish a slow penetration into Estonia and, possibly, Latvia, Mr. Stalin answered in the affirmative and added that nevertheless the present government system, ministries, etc., would be temporarily preserved in Estonia.

"Stalin said concerning Latvia that the Soviet government was going to make her a similar proposal. If the latter declines the proposal of a mutual assistance pact on the same conditions as proposed to Estonia, the Soviet Army will deal* with it in the shortest possible time.

"As for Lithuania, Stalin said that the Soviet Union would annex it if an agreement is reached with Germany to the effect of 'exchange' of territories. In the first part of the talk, Stalin was less explicit as to his intentions concerning occupation of Lithuania."

Unfortunately, no text of Selter's talk in Moscow is available to us. Instead, we have texts of analogous negotiations with Latvian representatives which took place a few days later. There, Stalin told Foreign Affairs Minister Munters:

"I hope you won't blame us. Twenty years have elapsed and we've become stronger, as have you. We want to discuss the problem of airfields and military protection. We won't touch upon your constitution or your administration, ministries, foreign or financial policy, or your economic system."

But when the Latvian representatives failed to be compliant, Stalin became more explicit:

"I'll tell you bluntly: the division of spheres of influence is an accomplished fact."

Munters argued that Latvia had concluded a pact with Germany, too. Stalin replied:

"If not we, then the Germans may occupy you. But we don't want to abuse. Ribbentrop is a clever man..."

Molotov used to be still ruder at times. When during a conversation Estonian Ambassador Rei began a sentence with the words "Is it possible...," the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs interrupted him: "No, no!" Many years afterwards Molotov was utterly outspoken explaining his behaviour: "They had no choice... And we wanted the Baltics."

But let us return to the Hilger memorandum. During his second talk (it started on September 28)

*Since we have at our disposal only a German translation of Stalin's original Russian words, we can suppose that a much stronger Russian was used, something like what may be translated as "crush."

with Stalin and Molotov, Ribbentrop, who had already received instructions from Hitler to agree to the "exchange" of Lithuania, raised the question of the Baltics again.

The text reads:

"After this part of negotiations had been completed, the Minister requested Stalin to disclose in which form and when the Soviet government was going to realize their intentions with regard to the Baltics.

"Mr. Stalin answered that the Estonian government had accepted the proposals of the Soviet government and, proceeding from this, it could be expected that the corresponding treaty with Estonia would be concluded already on the evening of the same day or, at the latest, that night. After that Stalin announced the contents of the treaty with Estonia (by now already published). He also said that the treaty mentions Baltic Port as the place of deployment of Soviet warships, although it had been agreed by a special confidential convention that the ships would be also deployed in Tallinn, since the Baltic Port had not yet been sufficiently equipped. Stalin mentioned 25,000 troops as the upper limit of forces to be deployed in Estonia. According to his statement made during the previous session, the strength of the air brigade would be three regiments. Stalin said again in conclusion that no changes in the current political and economic system of Estonia or introduction of the Soviet system there were intended for the time being. The Estonian Constitution would be temporarily preserved, as well as the ministries. For a while Estonia would go its way in foreign political affairs."**

Thus, **"for a while."**

Dimitrov's evidence

But is it possible that Stalin, in his negotiations with Ribbentrop, somewhat "exaggerated" his intentions concerning the Baltics in order to intimidate his new ally? Maybe Hilger's notes were not accurate? It is quite admissible to ask these two critical questions. I withdraw the second one right away, because all his other notes of talks, paralleled by corresponding Russian versions, prove authentic. As concerns the first, its answer is facilitated by another document, this time found not in Schulenburg's archives, but among the papers of the Communist International leader Georgy Dimitrov. Our magazine has already cited notes from the diary which belonged to Dimitrov, with whom Stalin often had detailed discussions on various matters.

On October 25 (i.e., after pacts with the three republics were signed), he again met with Dimitrov in Zhdanov' presence. The diary reads:

"We think that in the mutual assistance pacts (with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) we have found the form which will enable us to draw a number of countries within the orbit of Soviet influence.

"But to accomplish this, we must show restraint: we must strictly comply with the requirements of their internal regime and their sovereignty.

"We will not pursue their sovietization.

"The time will come when they'll do it themselves!"

A slightly different version? But in principle it differs from the talks with Ribbentrop very little, Stalin told Ribbentrop about the mutual assistance pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Dimitrov was told the same. Stalin told Hitler's emissary that he would preserve the sovereignty of these states only "for a while." Dimitrov was told that "we must show restraint," but "the time will come." As for Stalin's confidence that the three republics "will do it themselves," the events of 1940 expressly demonstrated what he had in mind. Dekanozov, Zhdanov and Vyshinsky "did it themselves" in the summer of 1940.

So much for the documents. They are bitter for all who have long accepted the concept of the "socialist revolution" in the Baltics and of the voluntary union of the Baltic republics with the USSR. But documents, even though bitter, cannot be ignored. They are the salubrious medicine that cures the society from age-long illusions. The more documents are published, the sooner recovery will come.

But here, far from everything runs smoothly. When a few days ago heads of the Russian Federation Archive Committee turned to the General Department of the CPSU CC and, citing the President's decrees, demanded access to the most important documents, the answer was that the documents had been "handed over." Handed over to whom? An amazing story came to the surface. A few months ago, when the would-be member of the junta and omnipotent head of the General Department of the CPSU CC Boldin had been appointed as a no less omnipotent head of the President's apparat, he issued an order to transfer the key documents of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and CPSU from the Central Committee to the so-called Presidential Archive in the Kremlin. In other words, from Boldin to Boldin!

If one recalls that in 1989, when the commission headed by Yakovlev was at work, it was exactly Boldin who refused point blank to yield the most important documents, the design of the would-be putschist becomes absolutely clear: to keep everything under his own control. The putsch failed. Now the documents must be urgently examined and published. Such is the elementary demand, the fulfilment of which will serve both science and the final unmasking of Stalinism.

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

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THE PREVIOUS ARTICLE

A spectre of capitalism is haunting the Union. But the socialist idea is tenacious because it has become part of the culture. People cover their fear of the market with it. In order to understand what is happening it is necessary to go back to the sources of socialism.

About the history of the Great October Socialist catastrophy

2. The history of one temptation

Simon Soloveichik

WITH A GIRL IN A MERCEDES? It is best of all to start with a letter that was published in the magazine *Ogonyok* not long ago. It said: "Why do you attack socialism and rake it over the coals in every issue? You betray the system which millions gave their lives for. But I know what the Russian variant of capitalism is. It is the brazen mug of a businessman riding in a Mercedes with a hussy." (Yu. Mironov)

The angry reader could be answered just as angrily. He could be accused of being envious and rude and told how he should relate to the rich. It could be pointed out that the capitalists in the West also ride around in Mercedes cars with girls, and so on and so forth.

But he is right, in any case when he talks about the Mercedes in his letter. That is, he is not right, but he touches on one of the most important problems of mankind.

In the middle of the 18th century Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote about it, though he expressed it a bit more loftily: "...the natural right, no matter how we determine it, certainly wouldn't have a child rule over his elders, the fool rule over the wise and a few people roll in luxury while the great majority don't even have necessities..."

Both Mironov's letter and Rousseau's essay bring up social inequality. Why do some have nothing, and others everything?

Mankind can't cope with this problem, no matter how much it tries. No matter how much is written about envy, about leveling, or barracks socialism, what preaches are made, what philosophical approach taken to this problem, no matter how much they preach restraint and modesty – after all explanations and persuasion there'll be someone who will be envious when he sees that brazen mug, the Mercedes and the hussy. Why doesn't everyone have the same, each man a Mercedes and a hussy?

And today's defenders of socialism right off point out that with socialism there is equality (no one has anything of his own), but with capitalism there is social inequality. It's possible to give figures (they have been published) showing that things stand just the opposite: in developed countries the gap between the poor and the rich is less than here. Our privileged are not out in the open and we can't even imagine how they live, but that's beside the point.

Social inequality is really a disease.

Анти КАПИТАЛЪ

Moreover, it is disease number one, the most worrisome and dangerous. It is a disease which no society has been completely cured of so far. When they criticize America here for its poor and for discrimination they would be absolutely correct, if it were not for one circumstance: if it were not like the cry of someone dying of leprosy – look, look, lepers, they have leprosy!

It is thought that inequality is a consequence of capitalism. Actually, it's just the other way around: capitalism is a symptom of inequality. If you get cured of capitalism, inequality will not only remain, but will grow, though in other forms.

LONG LIVE ENVY? It's not right to only see the negative side of inequality. Inequality is a social disease. It is both a disease and a necessity – even a cure.

The disease: people are born unequal in ability. This is a fact. But society greatly increases the innate inequality.

The cure: due to inequality there arises a difference in potentials and this stimulates people to act, to undertake things, to strive and increase the social wealth which makes it possible to gradually even up the inequality.

So good for nature for being difficult, for its envious competitive conceit, for its unquenchable thirst to possess and have power! – wrote Kant. Without it all fine natural instincts in man would remain undeveloped. Man wants agreement, but nature knows better, knows what is good for him. Nature gives discord. Man wants to live well-provided and happily, but nature wants him to come out of his state of remissness and inactive self-satisfaction and dive head first into work experiencing difficulties so he will find the means to rationally overcome them.

THE FINAL SOLUTION. However, the poor and distressed are reluctant to take the dialectical views on suffering and poverty Can't we do away with inequality? The more so that the disease was new, unknown, for before inequality was not seen as unjust. The world had a reliable order: people were equal before God, but in the material world each had his place. The idea of social equality only surfaced in the 18th century, and with it the idea of injustice of inequality. But no one knows if the new disease is curable or not. It always seems that a cure is at hand and then there appear the charlatans and quacks saying they've a nostrum, which is inevitable. The worldwide search for a cure for the disease of inequality gave rise to the quack socialist ideas which, despite all their variety, have at their core a final solution to the problem.

It's possible to say that the ideology of a final solution to complex social problems is one of the biggest dangers to threaten mankind. For instance, all fascism hangs on one word, "to end." To end once and for all. That's why Hitler could call his party socialist. But since he intended to solve only the problems of his own people once and for all, and at the expense of others, his socialism was called nationalistic. And rightly so: national socialism is the final solution of national social problems.

The danger of the ideology of a final solution is heightened because in many cases it seems unusually noble. That is the way it was with socialism. When the socialist condemns inequality, poverty and rightlessness – why not sympathize, not say "yes," not respond heartily to his strong feelings? And we are not capable of seeing that he is unnoticeably (even to himself) becoming a quack and a charlatan, and the noble idea is becoming dangerous.

TOAST BEFORE GOING TO PRISON. It is best to seek the logical basis of an idea when it first arose in history, when it was still simple, naive and not sacred.

The 7th of April, 1849, the Thursday of Lent, in the big hall in the apartment of the Petersburg scholar and economist, Alexander Yevropeus was a table set for 11 – a formal lunch in honor of the birthday of a Frenchman, Charles Fourier, whose portait was specially ordered from Paris for the occassion. There were toasts written beforehand and the 26-year-old official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a general's son, Dmitry Akhsharumov gave a speech. In two weeks he was to go on an official visit to Constantinopole, but he should not have come to that lunch and given his speech. He did not go anywhere, but was almost immedialty arrrested, found guilty, given the death sentence and only pardoned at the scaffold – instead of death he would be in a convict labour gang. The court found his speech impertinent and containing dangerous ideas. Below is that part of his speech they objected to.

"We are surrounded by hundreds of millions of people who are deafened by nonsense and do not know that a new life awaits them and that they must get ready for it. It is our duty to open their eyes to their pitiful situation and raise them up to the new life. Yes, we must do this and must remember what a great cause we are working for: to go back to the laws of nature, trampled by the spreading of ignorance and to remake man in God's image, in all his greatness and beauty for which he lived so long. To free and organize the high harmonious passions squeezed and suppressed. To destroy the capitals, cities and to use all materials they are made of to build anew. And turn all this life of torment, poverty, misfortune and shame into a life of luxury, harmony, happiness, wealth, and cover all poverty-ridden land with palaces, fruits and flowers. That is our goal, our great goal, and there has never been any other goal as lofty as this... We will begin the transformation in our country, and it will be continued by the whole world..."

We are poor people – those then, and us now.

What is to be done? How should we live? Always and everywhere it is the same: misfortune, poverty, shame... Lies and nonsense... Well?

No one wants to stand the unbearable. But does man have the right to dream about the "remaking of all mankind according to his state," as Dostoyevsky derisively wrote? Of course, everyone has a right to dream about whatever he wants, but has he the right to go about such a remaking? Does he have a right to toy with mankind?

Here is one of the very first, still far from the future problems, moral barriers which has to be overcome by anyone who sets out along the socialist path.

So what? If it is so simple, so clear, if it's just a matter of returning to the laws of nature, and remaking man in God's image... To cover all our poverty-ridden land with palaces and fruits... A luxurious harmonious life – can that be bad? Akhsharumov, as all the Fourierists, wasn't a revolutionary. There were no bloody ideas of a dictatorship or a conspiracy at that lunch table, as with the Decembrists, or something of that kind. Just the opposite, as Dmitry Dmitrievich Akhsharumov later wrote in his memoirs (he lived until 1910), they sought in Fourierism a way to "save manking from evil, misfortune and unnecessary revolutions."

Temptation – that's what was there in the speeches of Akhsharumov and his friends, the "heat of temptation" as Pasternak said in connection with a sweeter temptation. But all the same, a heat limiting conscious-

ness and suppressing the feeling of responsibility.

The one thing all socialist ideas have in common is that they are attractive and tempting. They seduce, deceive, excite the mind: "And the heat of temptation flew up like an angel, two wings making a cross." The social, political temptation also has two wings: the current awful life and tomorrow when all will be happy, so it seems, that it is only necessary to cross the two wings and something angelic will descend on earth and the kingdom of God will come to the godless, rendered godless earth. Supposedly socialism was first a utopia and then became a science. But a utopia does not violate laws, it is simply a dream – like our science fiction, and a science the more so does not break laws, it reveals them. Temptation deceives, it makes the inaccessible seem easy to get and the impossible possible turning a dream into a passion causing bad deeds. For Dalh (the author of the Dictionary of the Russian Language of the 19th century – **Ed.**), to seduce was to persuade to do something (most likely something bad), to lure, to give a reason or opportunity to fall into sin; "when the temptation is great the conscience is silent."

Where there is temptation, the conscience becomes silent, where there is temptation there is tradegy. And vice versa: the tragedy of the socialist idea is that from the moment of its conception and to this very day it was and is a temptation, a lure, a false promise of a luxurious, harmonious life instead of misfortune and poverty. That's the way it always was and has remained so today. And those who today advocate socialism, not having learned anything, still promise us a happy life in a renewed socialist country, i.e. a new tragedy. The only difference is that those earlier got imprisoned or shot for their seduction, but now... What is there to say of today...

Those before were themselves seduced, not knowing what their thoughts, speeches and articles would lead to.

But today they know.

Temptation is a sin, those who have been tempted have sinned. But what would you call those who do it consciously?

THE HISTORY OF THE TEMPTATION. The whole history of socialism is the history of the growing temptation of new ideas and arguments, that is the growth of the degree of deceit. It is considered this is what turned socialism into a science. And though actually this idea, just like at its conception is far from reality and truth, it seemed more and more like the truth and reality, more scientific. The spectre haunting Europe gradually took form, its features stood out more and more clearly, it began to seem alive, at least not distinguishable from the living and many gradually forgot that it was only a spectre after all.

It is like in Andrei Tarkovsky's film *Solaris* where the desire of the astronaut to see his beloved in some secret way comes about, and she is before him in flesh, in all her earthly charm, just asking to be embraced and kissed. The stunned man doesn't immediately understand that this is but a phantom. But when he understood – what could he do? This is one of the most tragic abilities of the human soul – to be able to almost completely merge thought and reality, however without God's ability to overstep that line. Thus we get the existential pining of man since he isn't God. This pining is the source of all the ancient myths about metamorphosis, bringing to life and taking it away, making man into God and God into a man.

Therefore socialism is difficult to refute: it takes advantage of the tendency of man's mind to get lost in such transitions and its not by accident that Marxism was said to be historical materialism. Socialism always pretended to be objective, to be strictly material. It feared idealism and squeemishly and frightenedly distanced itself from it, for it is itself idealism and fake jumping, like that of a stuntman from desire to reality – though in reality the chasm remains a chasm.

So the moral, honest desire for people's happiness turns into something immoral, into deceit, as was already said. Further the morality remains on that level of an emotional outburst, while the deceit continues to grow, strengthens and becomes all the more crafty until morality becomes almost nonexistent and deceit practically total.

The words of Akhsharumov's speech seem only to be a dream. In order to become a political theory socialism first had to acquire economic flesh, a materialistic basis. To see how this was done, it is best to take the example of Chernyshevsky.

MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE AX. Chernyshevsky is accused of calling us to the ax. But in that book which all have read, the novel *What Is To Be Done?* there is nothing of the kind. In it revolution comes, as in all socialist works of the past century, in some kind of unclear bloodless form and wins out and that is all. However, the innocent socialist enthusiasm of his Vera Pavlovna was actually more dangerous, not just than an ax, but even the A-bomb of today. The dress making shop was the beginning of the process, whose full development led to the death of many more people than died in the bombing of Hirosima and Nagasaki taken together.

Let us look into the accounting books of the first described socialist enterprise – amazing details are revealed on reading it closely.

This is the way it was. Vera Pavlovna set up the shop, hired modest seamstresses, ran around the city taking orders and they began sewing. They made a profit. The question naturally arose of what part of the profit was the owner's? In other words, how to split the profit?

This is one of the simplest and main questions of mankind: how to divide the profit? When it comes down to it, not the means of production, not the lathes, but how much money I can make a day is important to me. This is at the heart of socialism-communism-capitalism, all questions of justice and injustice, all problems of exploitation, all reforms and revolutions. Hamlet's "To be or not to be" translated into the language of economics, though not so lofty, but no less tragic, would go, "How to split it up?"

For a man selleng his labour it turned out historically that the first question of how to divide the profit, what is left for him, what conditions will he work in, how can he realize himself were overridden by the important, but second question about ownership. All hid behind the problem of ownership and that is the way it is to this day. Recently I met an old woman doctor. She complained:

"I worked my whole life and now I will be a second-class citizen? I don't own anything..."

That's a very Marxist view: all people are divided into those who own property and those who do not, and naturally those who do not are second class. The revolution put them in the first place, but the advocates of the market want to turn them into nobody again. That is why the woman is against the market. She cannot even stand to hear the word "capitalism," she shudders at its mention.

She doesn not know that more than 90 percent of the people in the world do not own anything. They live by working, on the money they earn, and they do so with dignity or in any case not envying anyone. She does not know that they deceived her all along with political economy nonsense and that this deceit began long ago – about the time when Chernyshevsky's heroine, Vera Pavlovna proposed a new way of splitting the profit.

What was this new way?

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FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst ***Rostislav Zolotaryov***

Quite recently Moscow mourned the three young men killed in the defence of freedom and democracy. One can hope that they are the last on the list of victims of what would appear to be a completely moribund regime.

The list of victims is truly long. How many are there of these direct or indirect victims? How many of them were shot or dispersed within the Gulag? How many died from the unbearable burdens they bore to glorify the "most advanced" system, which so insatiably demanded more and more exploits? How many of them were killed in the war solely because of mediocre vainglorious generals with the "Supreme Commander" at their head?

The dead are mute. Buried or not, all are mute.

However, their silence is broken when the reality, created by the living lifts it ugly head. Then their voice, "the voice of the awakened heart of the people," as the philosopher we are now introducing once said, invokes the common sense and human dignity of the living.

This is precisely the theme of the essay that the eminent Russian thinker Semyon Frank, and whom we mention earlier in issue No. 31/90 – produced back in 1917. To this day the article that follows, published as a booklet in Moscow in August 1917, during the Kornilov insurrection, serves as a most appropriate reminder of the past and as a warning to all overly engrossed with the present, to all rushing towards the "bright future."

This refined, profound philosopher wrote infrequently on political subjects. Even his extraordinary literary talent did not always rise up to such pathos and percipience as is to be discovered in this essay, which, in effect, introduced a new series of his writings. One series was devoted to an understanding of the Russian revolution – a series which incidentally, was to incorporate also his contributions to the *Vekhi* (Landmarks) anthology even though they were written several years earlier.

Semyon Frank wrote his *The Dead Are Mute* not only under the influence of the tragedy of war which took a daily toll of human life and in effect plunged Russia into a whole series of cataclysms. He discerned the approaching disaster and felt troubled in his heart. He saw how many had been victimized by the abortive Bolshevik insurrection of July 1917. He already had a premonition of the coming Civil War and the many long years of the bloodbath of reaction.

The article below is to be featured in full in Semyon Frank's *Selected Works* that are to be published in the *From the History of Russian Philosophy* series supplement to the journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy).

The dead are mute

Semyon Frank (1877–1950)



Not so long ago newspapers featured a letter from a mother whose son had been killed in the war. She wanted to know how people denying the national implications of war and calling for immediate peace at any price would justify themselves before mothers mourning children killed in the war and also what would enable mothers to bear their intolerable grief should they no longer believe that the country needed their children's deaths.

Amidst the clamour of the speechifying and the screams of the crazed *living*, the feeble voice of the mother with her hushed reminder of the *dead*, went unheard. What have the living to do with the *dead*? After all, it has long been said that he who is asleep in his coffin should rest in peace as the living enjoy life!

For there is generally a pitiless law of life to the effect that the most precious past is inevitably consigned to oblivion and that oblivion is particularly deep when the present wholly absorbs the mind by virtue of its brightness, turbulence, and novelty, beckoning to the heart with unprecedented temptation. The hundreds of thousands of Russians in anonymous graves throughout that broad miles-long strip of land stretching from the Gulf of Riga to Galicia, Hungary and Bukovina, or beyond in enemy land, or behind the Caucasian range in faraway Turkey, Persia and Mesopotamia, are all contemporary with, and victims of, the "ancient regime": they are of the past, of history, of what has forever gone and now seems an absurd dream. These poor people of the past knew nothing of the freedoms in which we now indulge, saw nothing of the red flags in the streets and the squares, attended none of the rallies or meetings, had no inkling of the eight-hour workday, or of the socialist ministers who are rebuked for inadequate radicalism, or of the papery wealth in which their fortunate contemporaries wallow today. They gave no thought to internationalism, took no part in the elections to Soviets of Worker's and Soldier's deputies and even in dying convulsions continued to be slaves of the much-hated "bourgeoisie" and military discipline. What can they arouse in our hearts today except pity? Is it generally appropriate nowadays, amidst the cares and joys of the free building of the new life, to indulge in idle talk about the dead participants of the vanished past?

It would be useless to tell the living, lured by life's temptations, about their moral commitment to the memory of the dead. It would be ridiculous quixoticism to hope for success by appealing to nobility and loyalty to the past, with the reminder that their happiness, bought at the price of forgetfulness of those killed and betrayal of their cause and faith is something contemptible and unworthy of man. Yet perhaps it would be useful to remind those who have ears to hear that such forgetfulness of the dead is *dangerous* for the living. Indeed if not for conscience and human dignity, then

simple fear and political calculation should prompt a less indifferent attitude to the memory of the dead.

The dead are mute. Their countless army does not rise up from the grave, does not cry out at meetings, does not draw up resolutions, does not form unions, and does not have its representatives in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Their bones quietly rot in anonymous graves, indifferent to the noise of life and forgotten amongst it. Yet this army of dead is a great, if not supreme, political force for all our life and there depend on its voice the destinies of the living, quite possibly for generations to come. That mother's quiet rebuke is but a faint herald of the thunderous anger, with which the dead are about to fall upon the living...

Those who know how to see and to hear, those who perceive the present not as something autonomous, detached from the past, but as a transient instant of the fullness of life filled with the past and fraught with the future, know that the dead have not died, but are alive. Whatever their lot there, beyond this world, *here* among us, their martyrdom lives in *our* hearts and moves us. Rather we should say that they live on not in our hearts, not in the feeble, restricted, easily-forgetting and little-understanding minds of individuals, but in the deep subconscious of the great, supra-personal *heart of the people.*

The rumble of the victims of our past, of wars right and wrong, of revolutions and revolts – victims who have receded into oblivion, goes unheard: but we may always expect tremours in this historic soil and their thundering repercussions in the heart of the people...

A sober-minded thinking politician, no dreamer and no metaphysicist, has said wise words about our revolution, that it was not wrought by people, as and for that reason it cannot be destroyed by people. In effect that could be said of any true revolution: it is not made but suddenly rises up out of the depths of popular life: it comes as an unexpected earthquake, when deeply concealed forces break out of the earth's inner bowels. It is precisely the heaving heart of the people. Incidentally, for that reason all "continuation of the revolution" is but a despicable, senseless, even blasphemous self-opiniated idea, as if not content with just one tremor, people intend to go on rocking the earth by their own efforts. What comprised these forces in the heart of the people, that having burst out, generated the political quake of February and March? All realize that the revolution is the side effect of war, that suffering heart of the people, offended by the unscrupulous old regime, threw out this regime in one gust of passion. When attempting to fully disclose the concrete meaning of this event, we shall necessarily realize that the revolution was wrought by the *phantoms of the war dead.* The heart of the people brimmed over with the blood of the countless war dead. To preserve the balance, an especially gentle, sensitive care for its suffering was needed. However, it was insulted instead, and the phantoms of the war dead it held sacred were offended by treachery, frivolty and indifference. A negligible external impetus sufficed for the army of indignant phantoms to rise up from deep down in the heart of the people and, led by a handful of men in the streets of Petrograd, depose the 300-year-old monarchy in a mere three days. It would be utterly myopic to imagine that it was Petrograd's worker and soldiers who won freedom. Hence let us pay due tribute to those in whom the conscience of the people spoke out earlier that the others...

Could one really think that this speck in the boundless sea of Russian life would prove victorious had not countless reserves from the heart of the people flowed in an irrepressible torrent towards the insurgent handful? Does one really not realize that the easy, almost bloodless, revolution of the streets of February 27 – March 2 was only the outer manifestation, the froth on top of the great internal uprising of the dead in the heart of the people? Who compelled revulsion against the old regime, renunciation of the seemingly firm pillars of the old life and the millions strong army, but yesterday obedient to the monarch, and all Russians including convinced conservatives and monarchists? This was a miracle that could not be wrought by any politician or anyone in general; even the crimes of the ancient regime would have not been enough. This was wrought by the hundreds of thousand of sorrowful martyrs whom the heart of the people mourned and in whose name and with whose spiritual power they rose up in full stature as one great, invincible being.

Yes, the dead are mute. However, one must always remember that everything that is great matures and is worked silently, that historic events are created not at meetings, but in the mysterious silent depths of the heart of the people. Those quiet, unobserved "tears of poor mothers"... are initial manifestions with today's clamour of the subterranean life of the dead in the heart of the people. These tears prepare for us what may well be a new and equally unexpected grand upheaval.

However, I already hear the objection: who dares speak on behalf of the dead?..

What the dead would think were they not dead, but alive, is in the long run, an absolutely idle issue, for perhaps many of them would be as sinful, blind, and crazed as the living now are. However, they are dead, and live only as transfigurations in the heart of the people... In this transfiguration deep down in the heart of the people, within which they are a truly effective force, they silently remonstrate against deliberate and unconscious betrayal, against democratized marauding, against the senseless and unscrupulous feasting in their graveyard, against the plunder of their own country which is steeped in their blood. Today their rumble as yet goes unheard by the less sensitive ear; the dead do not cry out, for they are mute; but they were mute even before February 27. Should they again speak to us with that same thunder with which they then spoke to the ancient regime, it will already be too late. The vengeance the dead wreak is fearful indeed! When their phantoms are again brought up to the pitch of outright indignation within the heart of the people, then in an outburst of blind, crazed indignation against those insulting their memory, they may plunge the country for years to come in those self-same shambles of the darkest reaction from which they extricated it. Precisely because even after the revolution they continue to live on in the heart of the people unsatisfied and avenged, and their phantoms suffer still greater insult and indifference than before, we live as if on the brink of a volcano and may at any instant expect another sudden upheaval of the historic soil whose blind anarchic force may destroy and wipe off the face of the earth not only the evil, but also all the goodness of our new life. The ancient regime was swept away by an ocean of blood and tears of the poor mothers and widows. This blood and these tears may as easily wash away the new power without a trace. The revolution was made by the phantoms of the war dead, and its entire fate depends on them.

So let us revere the phantoms of the dead in the heart of the people. But if we are no longer able to revere them, let us at least retain a memory of them that would cause us to fear them and reckon with them. Only a life that has not broken with the nourishing vital juices of the past is worthwhile and capable of self-preservation.

The dead are mute. But the obligation we owe not only to them but also to ourselves and to our children is to turn a sensitive ear to the mysterious, grand, now well-intentioned, now menacing, implications of their silence.

Fifty-five-year-old **Ivan Drach,** Chairman of the Ukrainian Popular Movement *Rukh*, has been criticized by the former Party press. In an attempt to answer the question "Who are you, Mr.Drach?" the newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy* carried out a thorough analysis of the poet's works. The conclusion was reached that "populist political activist" Ivan Drach most often addressed in his poems "Lenin, the October revolution, communism, socialism, the Communist Party, and Taras Shevchenko, he praised nuclear power engineering and scientific and technical revolution as a whole, the friendship of the fraternal nationalities of the USSR and opposed Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." Since Ivan Drach has never been arrested, the newspaper of the Ukrainian communists concludes that the poet was a typical conformist and a talented time-server with a party card. The Communists forgot their repeated attempts to exclude Drach from the Communist Party, until he finally left its ranks of his own accord.

The paper believes that the poet drastically changed his views only in 1989 when he put forward the idea of forming the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika. The party paper also recalled how people led by Drach pulled down a monument to Lenin and erected a monument to Bandera, and how he "organized a hunger strike of students" in the central square in Kiev.

The only argument the communists still have against democrats, apart from Marx' *Das Kapital*, is the fact that at one time they were loyal to the CPSU.

* * *

Following two years of miraculous success 23-year-old American actress **Julia Roberts** is beginning to lose her popularity. Her latest movie *Dying Young*, in which she played the romantic role of a young girl slowly dying of a grave illness, was described by the critics as the greatest failure of 1991.

For the first time Roberts appeared on screen in 1988 in the movie *Mystic Pizza*. And a year later she began receiving numerous offers from film directors. The film *Pretty Woman*, a fantastic love story about a millionaire and a prostitute, made some 175 million dollars at the box office. Julia's next two films did not break this record, though they were also successful at the box office. Roberts was said to be able to save any movie. And then came the first failure. The American press attributes this to the actress' quarrel with her fiancé. The wedding never took place, so naturally, the actress was in no mood for acting.

However, director Stephen Spielberg gave her no time to get over it and invited her to be in his screen version of Peter Pan, a fairytale by J.M. Barrie. And again Roberts was not at her best.

Julia's producers are waiting for the actress to find a new source of inspiration, while the actress herself is waiting for a new fiancé.

K. Shukhnov

* * *

Lozansky's new idea

The physicist and human rights activist **Eduard Lozansky,** who founded the Independent University in Moscow two years ago, is going to open another educational establishment in the Soviet capital – the International University. According to Lozansky's idea, Soviet students will be able to listen to lectures of leading scientists and cultural personalities from around the world.

In 1968 the young scientist, then assistant professor of the Malinovsky Armoured Forces Academy, spoke out in defence of Sakharov and Leontovich and criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. As a result he was dismissed from work and debarred from research, and in 1976 he was allowed to leave for the United States, but without his family. In the United States Lozansky got a chair at the University of Rochester, a new research laboratory and an opportunity to conduct research. But he couldn't plunge into his favourite work. His wife was still forbidden to leave the Soviet Union. That's how Lozansky was drawn into the human rights movement and got to know Bukovsky and Maximov. In 1981 in response to the call to Western scientists to support Dr Sakharov, exiled to Gorki, Lozansky set up in the US the Andrei Sakharov Institute. The aim of the Institute was to promote Sakharov's ideas and work against human rights violations in the Soviet Union. In 1982 Lozansky's wife went on a hunger strike. Her only demand was permission to leave the Soviet Union. The 33-day-long fast was covered by the press all over the world, except the USSR. Nevertheless, Moscow felt the pressure of world public opinion. A special meeting of the CPSU Central Committee decided to let her go.

"Many people thought that after my wife's arrival in the US I would quiet down and return to scientific work," says Lozansky. "But it would've been unfair to Soviet political prisoners and the rest of my countrymen deprived of human rights."

In 1986 Dr Sakharov returned from exhile. There was no more need for the Andrei Sakharov Institute set up by Lozansky. "However," Lozansky says, "we still did not trust Gorbachev, he continued the war in Afghanistan and hugged Kim Il Sung and Ceausescu." The émigrés expressed their doubts in their famous letter *Let Gorbachev Give Us Guarantees*. The letter was written by Bukovsky in Lozansky's apartment. But in the late 1980s Eduard changed his attitude towards the Soviet Union. Maybe because of his visit to his former homeland.

At present he needs 200 hectares of land and 150 million dollars to open the new International University. The Russian government and the Moscow City Council promise to give the land. And the money Lozansky hopes to receive from private Western companies.

24-year-old judo wrestler **Li Chang-Soo** is the first North Korean athlete to have fled to the peninsula's south because he disagrees with the country's policy.

The captain of the North Korean judo team disappeared from the train going from Barcelona to Moscow. His fellow athletes did not pay too much attention to this episode. But several days later Li appeared in Seoul, where he asked for political asylum. Chang-Soo said that he defected because he felt that on his return home from the Judo World Championship in Spain he would be excluded

from the national team and sent to work at a coal mine. His suspicions were not groundless. Some time ago his father, a former North Korean diplomat, was sent to forced labour, after he refused to bribe his chief.

Chang-Soo won the bronze medal at the International Judo Championship in 1989 and the silver medal at the Asian Games in 1990. He received a warm welcome in Seoul, and hopes to win the gold at the coming Olympic Games.

* * *

Leslie Colley, a resident of the Australian town of Ararat in the state of Victoria, has for the second time become a father at the age of 92. His 38-year-old wife Patty says that the conception was planned, though she does not deny a considerable share of luck in this case. Mrs Colley told reporters that her husband had been "really strong." The baby named Oswald has a half brother – Colley's son by his first marriage – he is 71 years older than the baby.

Colley's telephone keeps ringing day and night. Ever since the news from the local maternity home filtered into the press friends and strangers have been congratulating the happy couple, expressing their admiration and bewilderment.

Unfortunately, the sensation will not get into the Guinness Book of Records, since it does not register feats of virility. Apparently the percentage of falsifications is too high.

* * *

The Crown Prince of Yugoslavia, 46-year-old **Alexander,** hopes that despite the civil war in his country the Yugoslav people will remember the successor to the throne and will invite him "to reign." He believes that constitutional monarchy will guarantee stability and national unity in Yugoslavia.

Alexander, the son of the last King of Yugoslavia

Peter II and a direct descendant of Queen Victoria of Britain, graduated from a military academy in the United States, studied at a university in Scotland and served for 7 years with the guards' regiment of Her Majesty Queen Elisabeth. When he became bored with the high life he went into business in New York. This helped him mend his finances and acquire a slight American accent.

The Crown Prince has never been in Yugoslavia. But he wants to return to his ancestors' land and receive an enthusiastic welcome from his subjects. However, they say that there is little chance that his hopes will materialize, no more than those of his relatives – the kings of Romania and Greece.

* * *

If the German TV detective Derrick – played by 67-year-old **Horst Tappert** – is not as popular with Soviet TV audiences as the

Italian supercommissioner Catani, he is sure to be more experienced than the latter. Since 1974 Tappert has played in 200 films of the endless criminal TV series *Derrick*, which not only won the actor popularity, but also pretty handsome dividends to the 2nd German Television. *Derrick* is watched in 90 countries, including the Soviet Union. In Western Europe it successfully rivals American hits from the *Denver* and *Dallas* series. The criminal police commissioner Derrick is unhurried, reserved, but resolute and resourceful. He shoots less than commissioner Catani and his love affairs look more modest, but the roles he played assure one of the inevitable victory of law and order over the criminal world.

His success on the screen fighting swindlers, thieves, and murderers has not turned his head. "I don't think that I would make a good policeman," says Horst Tappert. "Nor do I think that the work of policemen is as interesting as it appears on TV. Besides, policemen are paid very poorly."

He was the first to say the word "invasion"

Edvins Inkens, the author and host of the most popular Latvian TV show *Labvakar*, is often labelled "Lettish Nevzorov". Naturally enough, Inkens is resolutely against it.

"I believe" he says, "that the highest criterion for a journalist must be the truth, as well as some basic principles of journalistic ethics. I can't say that I've never made any mistakes. But I made them for the some reasons as the rest of the Latvian people in the beginning of our national rebirth. For instance, we believed (and said so in our TV shows) that there were 300 thousand Soviet soldiers in Latvia, though in reality this figure is greatly exaggerated. But I never told any deliberate lies.

Edvin believes that this is not the only thing that distinguishes him from Nevzorov. Inkens is not prejudiced against the opinions of the people, and is ready to provide his TV time to anyone, whether he speaks Lettish or Russian, though his program is often described as nationalistic. Perhaps due to the fact that in the first months of its existence he offended the national interests of non-Lets. He says that he did it on purpose, since "there was no other way to wake the national spirit of Latvia." Two years ago Inkens was in the very centre of the national movement. A people's deputy to the Soviet parliament, he was the first to describe the Soviet presence in the Baltic republics as an "invasion," which caused a storm of indignation in Moscow.

All this notwithstanding, Edwin feels that his main calling is international problems. He even wanted to enter the Moscow State Institute of International Relations after high school, but changed his mind and entered the journalistics department of Moscow University. He hopes to end up as an international affairs reporter. In the meantime he has been appointed political adviser to the Chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers.

Pavel Sudoplatov

Boris Zhutovsky

The lace-curtained bay window of a large light sitting room opened onto a city street and a grey obelisk inscribed "To Three Hundred Russian Soldiers Who Fell in the Battle of Borodino." This apartment house was built for the country's party elite, through Deputy Fedos Shavlyugin's heroic effort, on what used to be a Moscow cemetery.

The house's heyday came much later, when Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Nikolai Shcholokov took up residence there and spent the last years of their lives in it. Memorial plaques were affixed to its façade, only to be removed later. Guards were posted at the front door and then recalled when there was no one left to guard. The flats fell into disrepair, and heaps of used water pipes, bathtubs and broken tiles grew in the backyards. The obelisk was moved to the Borodino Battle Panorama, and the Russian soldiers' last resting place became a stretch of asphalted roadway for cars to roll along and for street sweepers to clean. The Jewish cemetery nearby also disappeared under the Central Committee's apartment block, and neighbourhood kids often bruised themselves on tombstone fragments with Hebrew inscriptions on them.

...Seated on a sofa, under a large painting of red poppies set in a broad gilded frame (a war trophy) was a glamorous lady with a high forehead, large wide-set eyes, a small well-cut nose, and a loud husky voice. As she was chatting with the hosts of the apartment, their son (a friend of mine) and myself went all out to impress her. In parting, the glamorous lady, Emma Karlovna, asked us over to her place.

She lived in the Yagoda mansion (in its right-hand part, to be exact), at Markhlevsky Street.

She had two sons, I was told – one a telephone fitter and the other, a schoolboy. Dim memories of the night of thirty years ago are now coming back to me: the tea, the grand piano, and my curiosity about the lady. I learned that Emma Karlovna's husband, Lieutenant General Pavel Sudoplatov, Beria's faithful and obedient minion, had undergone a nervous breakdown during the highly eventful years of 1955 and 1956, and fell into a lethargic sleep as a result. While asleep, he was slandered, accused of all sorts of crimes, condemned, convicted, then woken up and jailed. His other colleagues were shot, and they deserved it. Sudoplatov himself was locked up in the Vladimir Prison, and while he served time there, Emma Karlovna was heroically fighting poverty and injustice for her own and her children's survival. She made a living not by washing floor and windowpanes, of course, but by sewing dresses for her acquaintances. She remained jovial and talkative – when in company, at least – and kept enjoying herself as best as she could. I saw her on a number of occasions at my friend's place and enjoyed her conversation very much each time; I hope she enjoyed mine, too.

It was at that time that I asked a close acquaintance of mine about Sudoplatov.

My source was an "insider," so the information he gave me came straight from the horse's mouth.

"How come you've heard about him?"

I explained.

"He is an arch-murderer involved in the attempt on Trotsky's life, in other acts of violence committed by the counterintelligence service, in 'taming' the annexed Baltic states, in shooting Polish officers in Katyn, in setting up deadly concentration camps all over the country... You'd better forget him."

Hard as I tried, I could not forget Sudoplatov... Many years, almost a lifetime, later, at the end of the 1970s, I was asked over by the old crony who had once introduced me to Emma Karlovna. By that time, he had moved to a new address, leaving the old apartment to his adult children and their own progeny.

"Come and see me tonight," he told me. "Emma Karlovna and Pavel Anatolyevich are coming, too."

That was how I first set eyes on him.

He turned out to be a short man with a thick head of salt-and-pepper hair, enormous black eyebrows, and a twinkle in his tiny eyes (or rather in one of them, the other looking as if it was not of much use to him). He had a lipless mouth, and wore a dark suit complete with a waistcoat, and well polished shoes. His small hands were dry and soft.

Emma Karlovna had gained some weight since I saw her last, and sat on a different sofa, but the picture on the wall behind her was the same, and her voice was as loud as I remembered it.

They had brought their junior son along – well-groomed, tall and conceited.

As he talked to his father – whom he obviously regarded as the only one of us present worth his while – he screwed up his near-sighted eyes framed with eyelashes as long as his mother's.

We went out for a smoke.

The conversation turned to Alexander Solzhenitsyn – at that time his relations with the regime were extremely strained. We commented on that in half-finished phrases like: "Those bad guys... At it again... A courageous man... We who are with him in spirit... If only... We should, by all means..."

Backstairs courage. In a pause, he suddenly thrust his round chin out and said: "If I had my way, I know what I'd do to that Solzhenitsyn, and with my own hands..."

As cups of tea and slices of cake were passed round, Emma Karlovna kept talking, and Pavel Anatolyevich grinned.

More years have dragged on since then as my friends, my city and the nation at large vegetated in a weedy graveyard of opportunities and ideas spreading over a sixth of the globe.

When a faint glimmer of hope came in the mid-1980s, I phoned my friends one day and made the following suggestion: "Why don't you let me draw a portrait of Pavel Anatolyevich? After all, time waits for no man, and he is quite well advanced in years now..."

"What for?"

"I've always drawn all those I thought worthy of being portrayed for posterity."

Sudoplatov gave his consent on the following day, and I set out for his place.

He had a new apartment, near the television centre, in a busy street – once an elm-lined road leading to the Ostankino Park.

Emma Karlovna was seriously ill and confined to her double bed. Although aged, she kept her voice, her lovely wide-set eyes, and her keen intelligence. The rooms and the kitchen were crowded with pieces of furniture of different periods and in varying states of repair, brought in from different places, but equally uncared for – the apartment looked like a cuckoo's nest.

Photographs of grown-up children and grandchildren were displayed on the glazed bookshelves of the host's "study." In other photos the host himself appeared in the company of KGB school cadets. These pictures had been taken in various cities around the country, all of them a short while back.

© **Boris Zhutovsky.** A magazine version.

There was not a single old photo or one given as a gift.

I spotted two small landscape paintings on a wall. "These are by Shcherbakov, one of our men. You like them?"

The books. "These are mine. I write a lot, you see, but publish my stuff under a penname, for obvious reasons. Together with I.G. I burrow in the archives, and she is clever with her pen. She is also one of us."

Gradually I got the feeling that "our men" had been surrounding me throughout my life, that they were watching me in that room – from the walls, through cracks in the parquet floor, from behind the chandelier, from under the armchair, even from a fighter plane flying high in the sky...

We got down to work.

My host was neatly dressed. Although he wore slippers, he had an evening suit on, and although he has decided against a tie, his shirt was all buttoned up. His second eye had revived, his hands had dried up and become covered with old-age spots.

Just in case, Pavel Anatolyevich asked what the big idea was of making his portrait.

I repeated my legend.

I wondered what his reaction would be, but the "sitter" was silent.

Suddenly I took heart and, trying to induce him to start a conversation, asked whether he felt like writing his reminiscences.

"No, this is impossible," he replied drily.

My trick did not work.

Sensing my curiosity and probably wishing to make up for his impoliteness, he suddenly started telling me about the heroes of his own books – the "fiery revolutionaries." The urge to write was in his blood – surely he did not rummage through the archives to make a living – and the secrets accumulated by the empire throughout the decades of its existence were arranged on the shelves of his memory neatly and compactly.

He was eager to go down in history. This desire has always been shared by the majority of mankind. Examples abound – from the crosses inscribed by the early crusaders on the walls of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem to the names of squares and ships all over the world. My suggestion that he sat for a portrait offered him a chance – and, at the same time, was perfectly safe!

Then he proceeded to the subject of the war and the partisan movement of which he considered himself an organizer.



Sudoplatov's "laboratories of death" were all around Siberia. "There was a lot of humanism," he recalls

In general, the war was for many of "them" an event which made them the defenders of their nation, the fighters for an indisputably right cause, against the enemy; it is associated with victories and fireworks. The war also gave them a chance to embellish their own and their comrades-in-arms' records and, as years went by, to expiate their sins with their wartime "heroism." Until recently, no one has thought in earnest about the price paid for victory or accused its generals of wasting human lives. The monstrous toll on the nation's manpower taken by the war was ascribed to the GULAG, to the death laboratories, to other bloody excesses.

A few years later, in 1990, I found myself in Kolyma and Chukotka and toured several of the former Stalin camps. Amidst the weirdly romantic landscapes of those parts, in gorges and on mountain tops, there were barracks encircled with barbed-wire fences; combs, bowls, buttons, and mittens were scattered everywhere.

In cemeteries, among boulders, I saw cracked human skulls and those with almost no teeth left.

After persistent inquiries only one person, in Magadan, finally ventured to tell me about Sudoplatov's death laboratories (others kept silent or tried to talk him out of discussing the matter). Such laboratories functioned in the Karlag (Karaganda labour camp) as well, and people knew about them back at the time of their existence...

The war was a legitimate trump card for my "sitter."

"You know, Borya, it happened long ago after I had left Odessa for Kharkov leaving Emma behind," he went on after an interval of silence, leaning against Emma Karlovna.

"There was a lot of hard work to do, with enemies everywhere, and when I got tired I would go back to Odessa to rest and be with Emma. Having returned to Kharkov one day, I learned that anti-Soviet leaflets had appeared there, a great deal of them, copied by hand in a child's handwriting. The word 'bourgeosie' was misspelled twice, which made it clear to us that the one who had written the leaflets was, indeed, a young person.

"We had ways of identifying such agitators, and we tracked down the young man in no time, of course. And those who were behind him, too..."

"Yes, of course," Emma Karlovna chimed in, not in order to support P.A. but simply out of the feeling of sympathy and justice which had filled her to overflowing.

"Yes," P.A. went on. "Kosior – have you heard the name? – was our leader then. We reported the incident to him."

I was about to ask whether they made the report after or before bumping the "agitators" off – but then thought better of it.

"Kosior heard us out very attentively, and then said: 'Don't touch the boy!' And can you imagine it, Borya, we didn't!"

I kept silent. So did Emma Karlovna, waiting.

Pavel Anatolyevich sat back and inhaled deeply. "Humane," he breathed out. "That's what we were, humane..."

The queen of beaches

The most democratic, accessible and spectacular sport

Popular sports have to make room for a new game which is gaining popularity. The whole world, from the United States to Japan, is keen on beach volleyball.

The game is played on an ordinary volleyball court, 9x9, but on the sand. Each team includes 4, 3 or 2 players, who play with an ordinary ball like in volleyball, only softer, and the game period is longer than in conventional voleyball.

The main condition is the sand. The ideal ground is that which allows the players to sink in the sand up to their ankles. "This puts everyone on equal footing," says Zinovy Cherny, a Soviet volleyball coach. "The average height of players in my Leningrad *Avtomobilist* is over 190 cm, but very tall players find it hard to play beach volleyball. It's a game for mobile, physically strong athletes with quick reaction and versatile technical arsenal."

The presence of a water reservoir close to the volleyball court concerns primarily movie and TV men. The picture on the screen looks more attractive with waves rolling along the shore. All Brazilian movies where the action takes place on the beach show people playing beach volleyball.

The new sport has given birth to a new industry. The gear includes special bathing suits for women; sunglasses costing between 70 and 100 dollars are the latest in fashion. And caps. The rules of the game even include a special paragraph concerning these caps: if a player touches the net with his cap, it is not considered a mistake.

The prize fund of beach volleyball tournaments in the United States varies from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Many leading volleyball players are also trying their hand at the new sport: Olympic champions Steve Timmons, Steve Salmons, Eric Sato, Scott Fortune, Robert Partie and others.

The Japanese managed to build a roof over the beach volleyball court. But in most cases tournaments are held on the ocean shore. And since it is easier to play without any shirts in the hot sun, the players have to be beautifully built. "When last year we were invited to the United States for a tournament of fours with a prize fund of 12 thousand dollars," says Zinovy Cherny, "one of the demands of the organizers was the attractive appearance of the players."

The most popular tournaments among spectators are "doubles" (they gather up to 80 thousand fans in Brazil). Volleyball, which used to be a collective sport, tends to individualization.

In the United States, this sport is included in the first five most popular sports. At the Olympic Games in Barcelona, it is planned to hold a demonstration tournament in beach volleyball in all the categories: two by two, three by three, and four by four.

The new sport appeared in the Soviet Union five years ago. The USSR Cup has been held for the third year now, and last spring Moscow hosted the country's first commercial 4x4 tournament in beach volleyball, with a prize fund of 2,000 dollars and 6,000 rubles.

The winners – the team of the Central Soviet Army Club – received the 2,000 dollars and an invitation to a professional tournament in New York.

The strongest beach volleyball players in the Soviet Union were athletes from Estonia. However, of late practically all the leading Estonian players have joined foreign clubs – in neighbouring Finland the new sport is very popular.

It was hard to make a better present to our sports fans than beach volleyball. It suits the shortages of our economy: the players need no shoes or socks, and they can do without shirts. All they need is a pair of shorts and good weather.



Photo from the magazine Eurovolley (Germany)

Natalya Bykanova

"Starkis" offers

Tatyana Ilchenko in the film "A Family Man"

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A moment during the shooting of "The Red Island"

A sequence from the film "The Red Island"

● For sale: artistic films completed in 1991:

– **"The Red Island"** – based on the works of M.Bulgakov about the post-revolutionary fate of the Russian intelligentsia.

– **"Wolves in the Zone"** – a social-psychological drama in the zone of the Chernobyl tragedy.

– **"A Family Man"** – A comedy about the life of a long distance driver.

● Films shot on order, services rendered to joint film shooting on the territory of the USSR.

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